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EMB-19: Safety Assessment

EMB 9 — Critical Identify

Mechanisms exist to evaluate the safety aspects of embedded technologies via a fault tree analysis, or similar method, to determine possible consequences of misuse, misconfiguration and/or failure.

Renumbered: Formerly EMB-15 in SCF 2025.4.

Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, EMB-19 was Safe Operations. That control is now EMB-23.

Control Question: Does the organization evaluate the safety aspects of embedded technologies via a fault tree analysis, or similar method, to determine possible consequences of misuse, misconfiguration and/or failure?

General (4)
Framework Mapping Values
CSA IoT SCF 2 GVN-09 GVN-10 LGL-01
IEC 62443-2-1 2024 DATA 1.3
NIST AI 600-1 MS-2.12-001
UL 2900-2-2 2016 8.3 9.2
US (1)
Framework Mapping Values
USA Federal DoW BaTB OT 2026 10
APAC (2)
Framework Mapping Values
APAC Australia CCM 2026 GOV-13
APAC Singapore CCOP CII 2026 3.4.1(f)

Capability Maturity Model

Level 0 — Not Performed

Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.

Level 1 — Performed Informally

SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.

Level 2 — Planned & Tracked

SCR-CMM Level 2 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude a well-defined and standardized process is required. ▪ At this level of maturity, the “requirements-driven” nature of performing the control is focused on a localized and/or regionalized implementation, not uniform and consistent across the organization. ▪ Requirements are narrowly scoped for applicability and are primarily derived from compliance obligations (e.g., laws, regulations and contracts).

Level 3 — Well Defined

Embedded Technology (EMB) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with EMB domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with EMB domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ An embedded systems team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain EMB domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of embedded technology operations (e.g., Configuration Management Database (CMBD) Asset Management solution). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with EMB domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to evaluate the safety aspects of embedded technologies via a fault tree analysis, or similar method, to determine possible consequences of misuse, misconfiguration and/or failure.

Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Level 5 — Continuously Improving

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Assessment Objectives

  1. EMB-19_A01 the safety aspects of embedded technologies are evaluated via a fault tree analysis or similar method to determine possible consequences of misuse, misconfiguration and/or failure.

Evidence Requirements

E-EMB-04 Safety Instrumented System (SIS) Documentation

Documented evidence of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), assigned Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) and safety assessments for embedded technologies.

Asset Management

Technology Recommendations

Micro/Small

  • IoT / OT safety assessment
  • Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)

Small

  • IoT / OT safety assessment
  • Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)

Medium

  • IoT / OT safety assessment
  • Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)

Large

  • IoT / OT safety assessment
  • Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)

Enterprise

  • IoT / OT safety assessment
  • Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)

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