IAO-03: Assessment Boundaries
Mechanisms exist to establish the scope of assessments by defining the assessment boundary, according to people, processes and technology that directly or indirectly impact the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of the Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD) under review.
Renumbered: Formerly IAO-01.1 in SCF 2025.4.
Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, IAO-03 was System Security & Privacy Plan (SSPP). That control is now IAO-09.
Control Question: Does the organization establish the scope of assessments by defining the assessment boundary, according to people, processes and technology that directly or indirectly impact the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of the Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD) under review?
General (12)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| AICPA TSC 2017:2022 (used for SOC 2) (source) | CC2.2-POF11 |
| COBIT 2019 | MEA04.04 |
| CSA IoT SCF 2 | SET-01 |
| ISO/SAE 21434 2021 | RQ-06-30 RQ-06-30(a) RQ-06-30(b) RQ-06-30(c) RQ-06-30(d) |
| NIST 800-37 R2 | TASK P-11 |
| NIST SP 800-66 R2 | 164.308(a)(8) |
| NIST 800-171 R3 (source) | 03.12.01 |
| NIST 800-171A R3 (source) | A.03.12.01 |
| SWIFT CSF 2025 | 7.3A |
| UL 2900-1 2017 | 4.1(g) |
| UN R155 | 7.2.2.2(e) |
| UN ECE WP.29 | 7.2.2.2(e) |
US (7)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal CISA CPG 2022 | 1.F |
| USA Federal DoW BaTB OT 2026 | 10 |
| USA Federal 21 CFR Part 11 2025 | 11.10(a) |
| USA Federal HIPAA Security Rule NIST SP 800-66 R2 | § 164.308(a)(8) |
| USA Federal HIPAA Administrative Simplification 2013 | § 164.308(a)(8) |
| USA Federal TSA SDP 2021-02F | III.G.2.e |
| USA Federal TSA / DHS 1580/82-2022-01 | III.F.2.b |
EMEA (8)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA EU Cyber Resiliency Act 2024 | Article 13(2) |
| EMEA EU EBA GL/2019/04 | 3.4.6.42 3.6.2.69 3.6.2.70 |
| EMEA EU NIS2 Annex 2024 | 6.5.2(c) |
| EMEA UK CAP 1850 2020 | A2 |
| EMEA Israel CDMO 2.0 | 4.2, Stage 1.3 |
| EMEA LUX CCSF 22/806 2022 | 96.b |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia CSCC-1 2019 | 1-3-1-1 2-13-4 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia ECC-1 2018 | 2-11-3-1 |
APAC (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.9 | 5.8.61.C.01 5.8.61.C.02 5.8.61.C.03 20.1.21.C.02 23.5.10.C.01 |
| APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 | 4.5.1 5.6.2 6.1.6 6.4.6 |
Americas (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| Americas Canada ITSP-10-171 2025 | 03.12.01 |
| Americas Canada OSFI B-13 2022 | 2.4.4 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
Information Assurance (IAO) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include: ▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with IAO domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation. ▪ Pre-production security testing-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel implement and maintain an informal process to conduct limited control testing of High Value Assets (HVAs) to meet specific statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for pre-production cybersecurity and data protection control testing.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Information Assurance (IAO) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IAO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with IAO domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IAO domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Information Assurance (IA)-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ IA management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ Pre-production security testing is decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel implement and maintain a limited Information Assurance Program (IAP) capability to conduct limited control testing to meet specific statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for pre-production cybersecurity and data protection control testing. ▪ IAP operations focus on protecting High Value Assets (HVAs), including environments where sensitive/regulated data is stored, transmitted and processed.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Information Assurance (IAO) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IAO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with IAO domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ An information assurance team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain IAO domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of information assurance operations (e.g., assessment scheduling software and risk assessment software). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IAO domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to establish the scope of assessments by defining the assessment boundary, according to people, processes and technology that directly or indirectly impact the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of the TAASD under review.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- IAO-03_A01 assessments are defined as (1) organization-level, (2) mission/business process-level, or (3) system/application/service-level.
- IAO-03_A02 the scope of assessments is established by defining the assessment boundary, according to people, processes and technology that directly or indirectly impact the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of the data and systems under review.
Evidence Requirements
- E-AST-02 Asset Scoping Guidance
-
Documented evidence of an asset scoping guidance. This is program-level documentation in the form of a runbook, playbook or a similar format provides guidance on defining in-scope Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD) (including third-parties).
Asset Management
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Define which systems and people are in scope for security reviews
Small
- Documented assessment scope (systems, processes, personnel) for audits/assessments
Medium
- Assessment boundary definition (people, process, technology) in assessment plans
- Authorization boundary diagrams
Large
- Formal assessment boundary methodology (e.g., FedRAMP/CMMC scoping guidance)
- Boundary documentation in SSP
- Scope approval by stakeholders
Enterprise
- Enterprise assessment scoping standards with documented authorization boundaries across systems
- GRC platform scoping and asset linkage