IAO-06: Assessor Independence
Mechanisms exist to ensure assessors or assessment teams have the appropriate independence to conduct security, compliance and/or resilience control assessments.
Renumbered: Formerly IAO-02.1 in SCF 2025.4.
Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, IAO-06 was Technical Verification. That control is now IAO-11.
Control Question: Does the organization ensure assessors or assessment teams have the appropriate independence to conduct security, compliance and/or resilience control assessments?
General (17)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| AICPA TSC 2017:2022 (used for SOC 2) (source) | CC4.1 |
| GovRAMP | CA-02(01) |
| GovRAMP Low | CA-02(01) |
| GovRAMP Low+ | CA-02(01) |
| GovRAMP Moderate | CA-02(01) |
| GovRAMP High | CA-02(01) |
| NIST 800-37 R2 | TASK A-1 |
| NIST 800-53 R4 | CA-2(1) |
| NIST 800-53 R5.2 | CA-02(01) |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (moderate) (source) | CA-02(01) |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (high) (source) | CA-02(01) |
| NIST 800-82 R3 | CA-02(01) |
| NIST 800-82 R3 MODERATE OT Overlay | CA-02(01) |
| NIST 800-82 R3 HIGH OT Overlay | CA-02(01) |
| NIST 800-171 R2 (source) | NFO - CA-2(1) |
| NIST 800-172 R3 | 03.12.02E |
| NIST 800-172A R3 | DS-A.03.12.02E |
US (7)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal CMS MARS-E 2.0 | CA-2(1) CA-2(1)-IS |
| USA Federal CJIS Security Policy 6.0 | CA-2(1) |
| USA Federal FFIEC ITEH 2016 | IV.A.3 |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (low) | CA-02(01) |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (moderate) | CA-02(01) |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (high) | CA-02(01) |
| USA Federal IRS 1075 2021 | CA-2(CE-1) |
EMEA (4)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA EU Cyber Resiliency Act 2024 | Article 13(2) |
| EMEA EU EBA GL/2019/04 | 3.4.6.42 3.6.2.69 3.6.2.70 |
| EMEA LUX CCSF 20/750 2020 | 3.4.6-43.a |
| EMEA LUX CCSF 22/806 2022 | 96.e |
APAC (1)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.9 | 4.3.16.C.01 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
Information Assurance (IAO) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include: ▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with IAO domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation. ▪ Pre-production security testing-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel implement and maintain an informal process to conduct limited control testing of High Value Assets (HVAs) to meet specific statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for pre-production cybersecurity and data protection control testing.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Information Assurance (IAO) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IAO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with IAO domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IAO domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Information Assurance (IA)-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ IA management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ Pre-production security testing is decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel implement and maintain a limited Information Assurance Program (IAP) capability to conduct limited control testing to meet specific statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for pre-production cybersecurity and data protection control testing.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Information Assurance (IAO) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IAO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with IAO domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ An information assurance team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain IAO domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of information assurance operations (e.g., assessment scheduling software and risk assessment software). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IAO domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to ensure assessors or assessment teams have the appropriate independence to conduct security, compliance and/or resilience control assessments.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Information Assurance (IAO) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- IAO-06_A01 independent assessors or assessment teams are employed to conduct control assessments.
Evidence Requirements
- E-IAO-04 Security Assessment Plan
-
Documented evidence of a plan to conduct security assessments.
Information Assurance
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Security reviews performed by someone other than the person who built/operates the system, or external assessor
Small
- Independent internal reviewer or third-party assessor
Medium
- Assessor independence requirements in the IA program
- Third-party assessments for critical systems
Large
- Independent assessment function (internal audit or third-party)
- Independence criteria documented
Enterprise
- Enterprise independent assurance function (internal audit, second line) and third-party assessors
- Independence standards aligned with IIA and regulatory requirements