IRO-16: Incident Stakeholder Reporting
Mechanisms exist to timely-report incidents to applicable: (1) Internal stakeholders; (2) Affected clients & third-parties; and (3) Regulatory authorities.
Renumbered: Formerly IRO-10 in SCF 2025.4.
Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, IRO-16 was Public Relations & Reputation Repair. That control is now IRO-12.
Control Question: Does the organization timely-report incidents to applicable: (1) Internal stakeholders; (2) Affected clients & third-parties; and (3) Regulatory authorities?
General (52)
US (30)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal CMS MARS-E 2.0 | IR-6 IR-6.a IR-6.b |
| USA Federal CISA CPG 2022 | 4.A |
| USA Federal C2M2 2.1 | RESPONSE-2g RESPONSE-3c |
| USA Federal CJIS Security Policy 6.0 | IR-6 |
| USA Federal FFIEC ITEH 2016 | III.C III.D |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (low) | IR-06 |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (moderate) | IR-06 |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (high) | IR-06 |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (LI-SaaS) | IR-06 |
| USA Federal IRS 1075 2021 | IR-6 |
| USA Federal 33 CFR Part 101 Subpart F | 101.625(d)(10) |
| USA Federal GLBA CFR 314 2023 | 314.4(h)(4) |
| USA Federal HIPAA Administrative Simplification 2013 | § 164.404(b) § 164.408(a) § 164.408(b) § 164.408(c) |
| USA Federal NERC CIP 2024 | CIP-008-6 4.2 CIP-008-6 4.3 |
| USA Federal NRC 10 CFR 73.54 2015 | 73.54(d)(4) |
| USA Federal SEC Cybersecurity Rule 2023 | Form 8-K Item 1.05(a) |
| USA Federal FCA CRM 2023 | 609.930(c)(3)(v) 609.930(c)(3)(vi) |
| USA Federal FINRA 2007 | 248.30(a)(3)(iii) 248.30(a)(4)(i) 248.30(a)(4)(ii) 248.30(a)(4)(iii) 248.30(a)(4)(iv) 248.30(a)(4)(iv)(A) 248.30(a)(4)(iv)(B) 248.30(a)(4)(iv)(C) 248.30(a)(4)(iv)(D) 248.30(a)(4)(iv)(E) 248.30(a)(4)(iv)(F) 248.30(a)(4)(iv)(G) 248.30(a)(4)(iv)(H) 248.30(a)(5)(i)(B) 248.30(a)(5)(ii) 248.30(a)(5)(iii) |
| USA California SB1386 2002 | 1798.29(a) 1798.29(c) 1798.82(a) 1798.82(b) 1798.82(c) |
| USA Illinois PIPA 2006 | 10(a) 10(a)(1) 10(a)(1)(A) 10(a)(1)(B) 10(a)(1)(C) 10(a)(2) 10(b) 10(b-5) 10(c) 10(c)(1) 10(c)(2) 10(c)(3) 10(d) 10(e)(2) 10(e)(2)(A) 10(e)(2)(B) 10(e)(2)(C) 12(a) 12(a)(1) 12(a)(1)(i) 12(a)(1)(ii) 12(a)(1)(iii) 12(a)(2) 12(a-5) 12(b) 12(b)(1) 12(b)(2) 12(b)(3) 12(b)(3)(i) 12(b)(3)(ii) 12(b)(3)(iii) 12(c) 12(d) 12(e) 12(e)(A) 12(e)(B) 12(e)(C) 12(e)(D) |
| USA Nevada Privacy Law 2023 | 603A.220.1 603A.220.2 603A.220.3 603A.220.4 603A.220.4(a) 603A.220.4(b) 603A.220.4(c) 603A.220.4(c)(1) 603A.220.4(c)(2) 603A.220.4(c)(3) 603A.220.6 |
| USA Nevada NOGE Reg 5 2024 | 5.260.4(a) 5.260.4(c) |
| USA New York DFS 23 NYCRR500 2023 Amd 2 | 500.17(a)(1) 500.17(c) 500.17(c)(1) 500.17(c)(2) |
| USA New York SHIELD Act 2019 | 3.2 3.2(a) 3.2(b) 3.3 3.5 3.5(a) 3.5(b) 3.5(c) 3.5(d) 3.5(d)(1) 3.5(d)(2) 3.5(d)(3) 3.8(a) 3.8(b) 3.9 5.2 5.2(a) 5.2(b) 5.3 5.6 5.7(a) 5.7(b) 5.9 5.10 |
| USA Texas BC521 2009 | 521.053(b) 521.053(b-1) 521.053(c) 521.053(d) 521.053(e) 521.053(e)(1) 521.053(e)(2) 521.053(e)(3) 521.053(f) 521.053(f)(1) 521.053(f)(2) 521.053(f)(3) 521.053(g) 521.053(h) 521.053(i) 521.053(i)(1) 521.053(i)(2) 521.053(i)(3) 521.053(i)(4) 521.053(i)(5) 521.053(i)(6) |
| USA Texas DIR SCSC 2.2 2025 | IR-06 IR-06-SID |
| USA Texas SB 820 2019 | 11.175(e) 11.175(f) |
| USA Texas TRAIGA 2025 | Sec. 3 / 541.104(a)(2) |
| USA Texas TX-RAMP Level 1 | IR-06 |
| USA Texas TX-RAMP Level 2 | IR-06 |
EMEA (26)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA Austria FAPPD 2000 | § 55(1) § 55(2) § 56(1) § 56(2) |
| EMEA Belgium Act 8 1992 | Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 61(1) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 61(2) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 61(3) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 61(4) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 61(5) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 61(6) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 62(1) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 62(2) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 62(3) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 62(4) Title 2, Chapter IV, Section 4, Art. 62(5) |
| EMEA Switzerland FADP 2025 | 3.24.1 3.24.2 3.24.3 3.24.4 3.24.5 3.24.5.a 3.24.5.b 3.24.5.c 3.24.5bis 3.24.6 |
| EMEA CHE FINMA Circular 2023/1 | IV.B.d-60 IV.C-68 IV.E-90 |
| EMEA Germany C5 2026 | AM-01.01AC.2 OPS-02.02B OPS-24.01B OPS-24.02B OPS-24.01AC CRY-13.02B SSO-05.06B SIM-01.03B SIM-04.01B SIM-04.02B SIM-04.01AC |
| EMEA Germany FDPA 2017 | 3.4.66(1) 3.4.66(2) |
| EMEA EU AI Act | Article 17.1(j) |
| EMEA EU Cyber Resiliency Act 2024 | Article 14(8) Article 15(1) Article 15(2) |
| EMEA EU DORA 2023 | Article 14.1 Article 14.2 Article 14.3 Article 19.1 Article 19.2 Article 19.3 Article 19.4 Article 19.4(a) Article 19.4(b) Article 19.4(c) Article 19.5 Article 45.3 |
| EMEA EU DORA RTS 2024 | Article 39.2(i) |
| EMEA EU EBA GL/2019/04 | 3.7.5.91 |
| EMEA EU GDPR 2016 | Article 34.1 Article 34.2 |
| EMEA EU NIS2 2022 | Article 23.1 Article 23.2 Article 23.4 Article 23.4(a) Article 23.4(b) Article 23.4(c) Article 23.4(d) Article 23.4(d)(i) Article 23.4(d)(ii) Article 23.4(d)(iii) Article 23.4(d)(iv) Article 23.4(e) |
| EMEA EU NIS2 Annex 2024 | 3.1.2(b) 13.2.2(c) |
| EMEA EU PSD2 2015 | 96(1) |
| EMEA UK DPA 2018 | Section 67(1) Section 67(1)(a) Section 67(1)(b) Section 67(2) Section 67(3) Section 67(4) Section 67(4)(a) Section 67(4)(b) Section 67(4)(c) Section 67(4)(d) Section 67(5) Section 67(6) Section 67(6)(a) Section 67(6)(b) Section 67(6)(c) Section 67(7) Section 67(9) Section 68(1) Section 68(2) Section 68(2)(a) Section 68(2)(b) Section 68(2)(c) Section 68(2)(d) Section 68(3) Section 68(3)(a) Section 68(3)(b) Section 68(3)(c) Section 68(4) Section 68(5) Section 68(6) Section 68(6)(a) Section 68(6)(b) Section 68(7) Section 68(7)(a) Section 68(7)(b) Section 68(7)(c) Section 68(7)(e) Section 68(8) Section 68(9) |
| EMEA Ireland DPA 2018 | s.85 s.86 |
| EMEA Kenya DPA 2019 | IV.43(1)(b) IV.43(2) IV.43(3) IV.43(4) IV.43(5) IV.43(5)(a) IV.43(5)(b) IV.43(5)(c) IV.43(5)(d) IV.43(5)(e) IV.43(6) IV.43(7) IV.43(8) IV.43(8)(a) IV.43(8)(b) IV.43(8)(c) |
| EMEA LUX CCSF 20/750 2020 | 3.5.1-60.d 3.5.1-60.f 3.7.5-91 |
| EMEA LUX CCSF 22/806 2022 | 110 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia IoT CGIoT-1 2024 | 2-12-2 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia ECC-1 2018 | 2-13-3-3 2-13-3-4 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia SACS-002 2022 | VII.A.TPC-23-BP1 |
| EMEA Serbia 87/2018 | IV.2.52 IV.2.52(1) IV.2.52(2) IV.2.52(3) IV.2.52(4) IV.2.53 |
| EMEA UAE NIAF 2023 | 3.3.3 |
| EMEA South Africa POPIA 2013 | 3.A.7.22(1) 3.A.7.22(1)(a) 3.A.7.22(1)(b) 3.A.7.22(2) 3.A.7.22(3) 3.A.7.22(4) 3.A.7.22(4)(a) 3.A.7.22(4)(b) 3.A.7.22(4)(c) 3.A.7.22(4)(d) 3.A.7.22(4)(e) 3.A.7.22(5) 3.A.7.22(5)(a) 3.A.7.22(5)(b) 3.A.7.22(5)(c) 3.A.7.22(5)(d) 3.A.7.22(6) |
APAC (23)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Australia CCM 2026 | RES-02 |
| APAC Australia Essential 8 2024 | ISM-0123 ISM-0140 |
| APAC Australia ISM June 2026 | ISM-0123 ISM-0137 ISM-0140 ISM-0733 ISM-1088 ISM-1609 ISM-1880 ISM-1881 |
| APAC Australia Prudential Standard CPS230 2023 | 42 |
| APAC Australia Prudential Standard CPS234 2019 | 35.0 36.0 |
| APAC Australia SOCI 2028 | 30BC 30BD |
| APAC China Privacy Law 2021 | Article 57 |
| APAC India DPDPA 2023 | 8(6) |
| APAC India RBI Digital Payments 2021 | 50.0 |
| APAC India RBI PPI 2025 | 15.3.o |
| APAC India SEBI CSCRF 2024 | DE.DP.S3 RC.CO.S2 RC.CO.S3 RS.CO.S2 RS.CO.S3 |
| APAC Japan APPI 2020 | IV.1.22-2(2) |
| APAC Japan ISMAP | 6.1.3.2 |
| APAC South Korea PIPA 2011 | IV.34(1) IV.34(1)1 IV.34(1)2 IV.34(1)3 IV.34(1)4 IV.34(1)5 IV.34(3) |
| APAC Malaysia RMiT 2025 | 10.35(c) 11.12 11.18 A10-B14(e) |
| APAC New Zealand HISF MLHSP 2023 | HHSP75 HML75 |
| APAC New Zealand HISF Suppliers 2023 | HSUP65 |
| APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.9 | 7.2.18.C.01 7.2.18.C.02 7.2.20.C.01 7.2.20.C.02 7.2.20.C.03 7.2.21.C.01 7.2.23.C.01 |
| APAC New Zealand Privacy Act of 2020 | 6.1.115(1) 6.1.115(2) 6.1.115(3) 6.1.115(3)(a) 6.1.115(3)(b) 6.1.115(4) 6.1.115(4)(a) 6.1.115(4)(b) 6.1.117(1) 6.1.117(1)(a) 6.1.117(1)(a)(i) 6.1.117(1)(a)(ii) 6.1.117(1)(b) 6.1.117(1)(c) 6.1.117(1)(d) 6.1.117(1)(e) 6.1.117(1)(f) 6.1.117(2) 6.1.117(2)(a) 6.1.117(2)(b) 6.1.117(2)(c) 6.1.117(2)(d) 6.1.117(2)(e) 6.1.117(2)(f) 6.1.117(3) 6.1.117(4) 6.1.117(5) |
| APAC Singapore CCOP CII 2026 | 3.2.2(b)i 7.1.1(b) 7.1.1(f) 7.2.2(c) 12.7.5 |
| APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 | 7.7.5 7.7.7 |
| APAC Singapore PDPA 2012 | 6A.26D(1) 6A.26D(2) 6A.26D(3) 6A.26D(4) 6A.26D(5)(a) 6A.26D(5)(b) 6A.26D(6) 6A.26D(6)(a) 6A.26D(6)(b) 6A.26D(9) 6A.26E 6A.26E(a) 6A.26E(b) |
| APAC Taiwan PDPA 2025 | I.12 I.12.1 I.12.2 |
Americas (7)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| Americas Argentina Reg 132 2018 | G.1.2 |
| Americas Bahamas DPA 2003 | V.48(2) V.48(3) V.48(3)(a) V.48(3)(b) V.48(3)(c) |
| Americas Bermuda BMACCC 2020 | 6.4 |
| Americas Brazil LGPD 2018 | VII.I.48 VII.I.48.1 VII.I.48.1.I VII.I.48.1.II VII.I.48.1.III VII.I.48.1.IV VII.I.48.1.V VII.I.48.1.VI |
| Americas Canada ITSP-10-171 2025 | 03.06.02.B 03.06.02.C 03.06.02.D |
| Americas Canada OSFI B-13 2022 | 3.4.1 |
| Americas Mexico FDPA 2010 | II.20 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IRO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with DCH domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IRO domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Incident response-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Incident response management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel operate an incident response capability using a documented and tested Incident Response Plan (IRP) to facilitate incident management operations that cover preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel facilitate prompt response to suspected or confirmed security incidents, including timely notification to affected stakeholders.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IRO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Cybersecurity personnel operate an incident response capability using a documented and tested Incident Response Plan (IRP) to facilitate incident management operations that cover preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery. ▪ An incident response team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain IRO domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of incident response operations (e.g., incident management software). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IRO domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to timely-report incidents to applicable: (1) Internal stakeholders; (2) Affected clients & third-parties; and (3) Regulatory authorities.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- IRO-16_A01 the time period to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident response capability is defined.
- IRO-16_A02 authorities to whom incident information is to be reported are defined.
- IRO-16_A03 personnel are required to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident response capability within an organization-defined time period.
- IRO-16_A04 incident information is reported to organization-defined authorities.
- IRO-16_A05 suspected incidents are reported to the organizational incident response capability within an organization-defined time period.
- IRO-16_A06 an incident response support resource that offers advice and assistance to system users on handling and reporting incidents is provided.
- IRO-16_A07 suspected incidents are reported to the organizational incident response capability within <A.03.06.02.ODP[01]: time period>.
- IRO-16_A08 incident information is reported to <A.03.06.02.ODP[02]: authorities>.
Evidence Requirements
- E-IRO-11 Incident Reporting Capability
-
Documented evidence of a capability to provide situational awareness of incidents to internal stakeholders and generated necessary reporting to affected clients, applicable third-parties and regulatory authorities.
Incident Response
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Basic incident response plan
- Designate incident response contact
Small
- Documented incident response plan
- Incident log
- Designated IR team
Medium
- Formal incident response program
- IR playbooks
- Tabletop exercises
Large
- Enterprise incident response program
- 24/7 SOC monitoring
- SOAR platform
Enterprise
- Enterprise SOC with SIEM/SOAR (e.g., Splunk SOAR, Palo Alto XSOAR)
- IR retainer
- Threat hunting