IRO-21: Detonation Chambers (Sandboxes)
Mechanisms exist to utilize a detonation chamber capability to detect and/or block potentially-malicious files and email attachments.
Renumbered: Formerly IRO-15 in SCF 2025.4.
Control Question: Does the organization utilize a detonation chamber capability to detect and/or block potentially-malicious files and email attachments?
General (11)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| CIS CSC 8.1 | 9.0 9.6 9.7 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG2 | 9.6 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG3 | 9.6 9.7 |
| ISO/SAE 21434 2021 | RC-05-15 |
| MITRE ATT&CK 16 | T1137 T1137.001 T1137.002 T1137.003 T1137.004 T1137.005 T1137.006 T1203 T1204 T1204.001 T1204.002 T1204.003 T1221 T1564.009 T1566 T1566.001 T1566.002 T1566.003 T1598 T1598.001 T1598.002 T1598.003 |
| NIST 800-53 R4 | SC-44 |
| NIST 800-53 R5.2 | SC-44 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 | SC-44 |
| NIST 800-160 Vol2 R1 | SC-44 |
| NIST 800-172 R3 | 03.13.14E |
| NIST 800-172A R3 | DS-A.03.13.14E |
US (1)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal DHS CISA TIC 3.0 | 3.PEP.EM.E3AEP 3.PEP.EM.MFPRO 3.PEP.EM.PDPRO 3.PEP.FI.DCHAM |
EMEA (4)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 2024 | 2411 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 - L1 2024 | 2411 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 - L2 2024 | 2411 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 - L3 2024 | 2411 |
APAC (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Australia ISM June 2026 | ISM-0651 ISM-0652 ISM-1389 ISM-1970 |
| APAC Japan ISMAP | 12.2.1.14 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IRO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with DCH domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IRO domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Incident response-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Incident response management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel operate an incident response capability using a documented and tested Incident Response Plan (IRP) to facilitate incident management operations that cover preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IRO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Cybersecurity personnel operate an incident response capability using a documented and tested Incident Response Plan (IRP) to facilitate incident management operations that cover preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery. ▪ An incident response team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain IRO domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of incident response operations (e.g., incident management software). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IRO domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to utilize a detonation chamber capability to detect and/or block potentially-malicious files and email attachments.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- IRO-21_A01 the system, system component or location where a detonation chamber capability is to be employed is defined.
- IRO-21_A02 a detonation chamber capability is employed within the organization-defined system, system component or location.
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Email provider attachment sandboxing (e.g., Microsoft Defender for Office 365, Google Workspace)
Small
- Email security with attachment sandboxing (e.g., Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Attachments)
Medium
- Email and web sandboxing/detonation (e.g., Microsoft Defender, Proofpoint, Mimecast)
- File detonation for downloads
Large
- Network and email detonation chambers (e.g., Palo Alto WildFire, FireEye/Trellix, Proofpoint TAP)
- Integration with SIEM
Enterprise
- Enterprise detonation/sandbox platform across email, web and endpoints (e.g., WildFire, Trellix, Check Point SandBlast)
- SOAR-integrated automated response