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MON-37: Control Assurance Automation (CAA) Data Feed Identification

MON 6 — Medium Detect

Mechanisms exist to reconcile authorized Control Assurance Automation (CAA) collection activities so that legitimate collection is known and distinguishable from unauthorized data exfiltration.

Control Question: Does the organization reconcile authorized Control Assurance Automation (CAA) collection activities so that legitimate collection is known and distinguishable from unauthorized data exfiltration?

Capability Maturity Model

Level 0 — Not Performed

Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.

Level 1 — Performed Informally

Continuous Monitoring (MON) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include: ▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with MON domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation. ▪ Event monitoring-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices. ▪ Monitoring is primarily reactive in nature, focused on identifying incidents that occurred. ▪ Event log reviews primarily rely on manual processes to identify anomalous behaviors.

Level 2 — Planned & Tracked

Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with MON domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Continuous monitoring-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Continuous monitoring may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.

Level 3 — Well Defined

Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Cybersecurity personnel use a structured process via Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) to review and analyze logs. ▪ A Security Operations Center (SOC) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain MON domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of continuous monitoring operations (e.g., Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC) enforce security event logging to contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis.

Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Level 5 — Continuously Improving

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Assessment Objectives

  1. MON-37_A01 authorized Control Assurance Automation (CAA) collection activities are documented, including the collecting system or service account, the data sources accessed, the data collected, the destination repository and the collection schedule.
  2. MON-37_A02 the frequency at which observed Control Assurance Automation (CAA) collection activity is reconciled against authorized collection activities is defined.
  3. MON-37_A03 Control Assurance Automation (CAA) collection activity observed in network and Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) logs is reconciled against the documented authorized collection activities at the defined frequency.
  4. MON-37_A04 collection activity that cannot be reconciled to an authorized Control Assurance Automation (CAA) activity is treated as potential unauthorized data exfiltration and investigated in accordance with incident response procedures.
  5. MON-37_A05 monitoring and data loss prevention rules are configured to recognize authorized Control Assurance Automation (CAA) collection so that alerts distinguish legitimate collection from unauthorized data exfiltration.

Evidence Requirements

E-CPL-12 Control Assurance Automation (CAA) Evidence Integrity Records

Documented evidence of integrity and chain-of-custody protections for automatically collected evidence, including tamper-evident storage, authorized data feed reconciliation and protection of aggregated telemetry.

Compliance

Technology Recommendations

Micro/Small

  • Documented list of any automated compliance data collection
  • Review of cloud/API access logs for unexpected data pulls

Small

  • Register of authorized automation service accounts and their data sources
  • Periodic review of API and data access logs

Medium

  • CAA data feed register maintained with the CMDB
  • SIEM allow-listing of authorized collection identities and destinations
  • Quarterly reconciliation

Large

  • CAA data feed register integrated with SIEM and DLP
  • Baseline of expected collection volume with anomaly alerting
  • Quarterly reconciliation by the SOC

Enterprise

  • Enterprise CAA data feed register integrated with SIEM, DLP and UEBA
  • Behavioral baselining of automation identities
  • Automated reconciliation and alerting on unregistered collection

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