QTS-09.2: Stateful Hash-Based Signatures for Firmware & Code Signing
Mechanisms exist to enforce stateful hash-based signature schemes in accordance with NIST SP 800-208 and require state-management controls necessary to prevent one-time key reuse for: (1) Firmware signing; (2) Secure boot signing; and (3) Other long-lifetime code-signing use cases.
Control Question: Does the organization enforce stateful hash-based signature schemes in accordance with NIST SP 800-208 and require state-management controls necessary to prevent one-time key reuse for: (1) Firmware signing; (2) Secure boot signing; and (3) Other long-lifetime code-signing use cases?
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
Quantum Security (QTS) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include:
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Quantum Security (QTS) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with QTS domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with QTS domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Quantum Security (QTS) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with QTS domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with QTS domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ A risk management team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain QTS domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of risk management operations (e.g., risk management solution, GRC platform and TPRM tool). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with QTS domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to enforce stateful hash-based signature schemes in accordance with NIST SP 800-208 and require state-management controls necessary to prevent one-time key reuse for: (1) Firmware signing; (2) Secure boot signing; and (3) Other long-lifetime code-signing use cases.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- QTS-09.2_A01 stateful hash-based signature schemes conform with NIST SP 800-208.
- QTS-09.2_A02 state-management controls necessary to prevent one-time key reuse are required.
- QTS-09.2_A03 stateful hash-based signatures are enforced for firmware signing.
- QTS-09.2_A04 stateful hash-based signatures are enforced for secure boot signing.
- QTS-09.2_A05 stateful hash-based signatures are enforced for other long-lifetime code-signing use cases.
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Use vendor-managed firmware signing
Small
- Use vendor-managed firmware signing
Medium
- Review code signing infrastructure for quantum vulnerability
- Plan migration to hash-based signatures for critical firmware
- NIST SP 800-208 guidance (https://csrc.nist.gov)
Large
- Hash-based signature scheme deployment for firmware signing
- NIST SP 800-208 compliance for firmware and code signing
- State-management controls to prevent key reuse
Enterprise
- Enterprise hash-based signature infrastructure for firmware and code signing
- NIST SP 800-208 compliant implementation
- Automated state management to prevent one-time key reuse
- HSM-backed hash-based key management