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SEA-03.2: Application Partitioning

SEA 8 — High Protect

Mechanisms exist to separate user functionality from system management functionality.

Control Question: Does the organization separate user functionality from system management functionality?

General (17)
Framework Mapping Values
GovRAMP Core SC-02
GovRAMP Low+ SC-02
GovRAMP Moderate SC-02
GovRAMP High SC-02
MITRE ATT&CK 10 T1068, T1189, T1190, T1203, T1210, T1211, T1212, T1611
NIST 800-53 R4 SC-2 SC-2(1)
NIST 800-53 R4 (moderate) SC-2
NIST 800-53 R4 (high) SC-2
NIST 800-53 R5 (source) SC-2 SC-2(1)
NIST 800-53B R5 (moderate) (source) SC-2
NIST 800-53B R5 (high) (source) SC-2
NIST 800-53 R5 (NOC) (source) SC-2(1)
NIST 800-82 R3 MODERATE OT Overlay SC-2
NIST 800-82 R3 HIGH OT Overlay SC-2
NIST 800-171 R2 (source) 3.13.3
NIST 800-171A (source) 3.13.3[a] 3.13.3[b] 3.13.3[c]
OWASP Top 10 2021 A01:2021 A05:2021
US (13)
Framework Mapping Values
US CERT RMM 1.2 AM:SG1.SP1 KIM:SG2.SP1 KIM:SG2.SP2 TM:SG2.SP1
US CJIS Security Policy 5.9.3 (source) 5.10.3.1
US CMMC 2.0 Level 2 (source) SC.L2-3.13.3
US CMMC 2.0 Level 3 (source) SC.L2-3.13.3
US CMS MARS-E 2.0 SC-2
US FedRAMP R4 SC-2
US FedRAMP R4 (moderate) SC-2
US FedRAMP R4 (high) SC-2
US FedRAMP R5 (source) SC-2
US FedRAMP R5 (moderate) (source) SC-2
US FedRAMP R5 (high) (source) SC-2
US IRS 1075 SC-2 SC-2(1)
US - TX TX-RAMP Level 2 SC-2

Capability Maturity Model

Level 0 — Not Performed

There is no evidence of a capability to separate user functionality from system management functionality.

Level 1 — Performed Informally

Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) efforts are ad hoc and inconsistent. CMM Level 1 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:

  • IT personnel use an informal process to design, build and maintain secure solutions.
  • IT /cyber engineering governance is decentralized, with the responsibility for implementing and testing cybersecurity and data protection controls being assigned to the business process owner(s), including the definition and enforcement of roles and responsibilities.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked

Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) efforts are requirements-driven and governed at a local/regional level, but are not consistent across the organization. CMM Level 2 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:

  • Architecture/engineering management is decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
  • A Change Advisory Board (CAB), or similar function, exists to govern changes to systems, applications and services, ensuring their stability, reliability and predictability.
  • Administrative processes and technologies focus on protecting High Value Assets (HVAs), including environments where sensitive/regulated data is stored, transmitted and processed.
  • IT/cybersecurity personnel identify cybersecurity and data protection controls to address applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for architecture/engineering management.
  • IT personnel implement secure engineering practices to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of the organization's technology assets, data and network(s).
  • Technologies are configured to protect data with the strength and integrity commensurate with the classification or sensitivity of the information and mostly conform to industry-recognized standards for hardening (e.g., DISA STIGs, CIS Benchmarks or OEM security guides), including cryptographic protections for sensitive/regulated data.
Level 3 — Well Defined

Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) efforts are standardized across the organization and centrally managed, where technically feasible, to ensure consistency. CMM Level 3 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:

  • IT/cybersecurity architects, or a similar function, enable the implementation a “layered defense” network architecture that enables a resilient defense-in-depth approach through the use of industry-recognized cybersecurity and data privacy practices in the specification, design, development, implementation and modification of systems and services (e.g., DISA STIGs, CIS Benchmarks or OEM security guides).
  • IT/cybersecurity engineers, or a similar function, operationalize enterprise architecture, aligned with industry-recognized leading practices, with consideration for cybersecurity and data privacy principles, including resiliency expectations, that addresses risk to organizational operations, assets, individuals, other organizations.
  • A Validated Architecture Design Review (VADR), or similar process, is used to evaluate design criteria for secure practices and conformance with requirements for applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual controls to determine if the system/application/service is designed, built and operated in a secure and resilient manner.
  • A Change Advisory Board (CAB), or similar function, governs changes to systems, applications and services to ensure their stability, reliability and predictability.
  • A formal Change Management (CM) program helps to ensure that no unauthorized changes are made, all changes are documented, services are not disrupted and resources are used efficiently.
  • An Identity & Access Management (IAM) function, or similar function, enables the implementation of identification and access management controls for “least privileges” practices, allowing for the management of user, group and system accounts, including privileged accounts.
  • An IT Asset Management (ITAM) function, or similar function, categorizes assets according to the data the asset stores, transmits and/ or processes and applies the appropriate technology controls to protect the asset and data.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled

See C|P-CMM3. There are no defined C|P-CMM4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to separate user functionality from system management functionality.

Level 5 — Continuously Improving

See C|P-CMM4. There are no defined C|P-CMM5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to separate user functionality from system management functionality.

Assessment Objectives

  1. SEA-03.2_A01 user functionality is identified.
  2. SEA-03.2_A02 system management functionality is identified.
  3. SEA-03.2_A03 user functionality is separated from system management functionality.
  4. SEA-03.2_A04 the presentation of system management functionality is prevented at interfaces to non-privileged users.
  5. SEA-03.2_A05 state information is stored separately from applications and software.

Technology Recommendations

Micro/Small

  • Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)

Small

  • Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)

Medium

  • Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)

Large

  • Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)

Enterprise

  • Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)

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