SEA-15: Fail Secure
Mechanisms exist to enable systems to fail to an organization-defined known-state for types of failures, preserving system state information in failure.
Renumbered: Formerly SEA-07.2 in SCF 2025.4.
Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, SEA-15 was Distributed Processing & Storage. That control is now SEA-25.
Control Question: Does the organization enable systems to fail to an organization-defined known-state for types of failures, preserving system state information in failure?
General (14)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| GovRAMP | SC-24 |
| GovRAMP High | SC-24 |
| IEC 62443-3-3 2013 | SR 5.2 RE 3 |
| IEC 62443-4-2 2019 | NDR 5.2(3) |
| NIST 800-53 R4 | CP-12 SC-24 |
| NIST 800-53 R5.2 | CP-12 SA-08(24) SC-24 |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (high) (source) | SC-24 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 | CP-12 SA-08(24) SC-24 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 LOW OT Overlay | CP-12 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 MODERATE OT Overlay | CP-12 SC-24 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 HIGH OT Overlay | CP-12 SC-24 |
| NIST 800-160 Vol2 R1 | CP-12 |
| OWASP Top 10 2025 | A01:2025 A05:2025 |
| SPARTA 4.0 | CM0044 |
US (1)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (high) | SC-24 |
APAC (1)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Malaysia RMiT 2025 | A5-A4(a) |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include: ▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with SEA domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation. ▪ Security engineering-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel use an informal process to design, build and maintain secure, compliant and resilient solutions.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with SEA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with SEA domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with SEA domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Secure engineering and architecture-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Secure engineering and architecture management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel define entity-specific secure engineering practices to protect the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Safety (CIAS) of the entity's TAASD. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel align secure engineering practices with the entity's broader IT architecture practices. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel use secure engineering practices to influence Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC).
Level 3 — Well Defined
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with SEA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with SEA domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ A cybersecurity engineering / architecture team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain RSK domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of secure engineering management operations (e.g., project management solution). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with SEA domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC) enforce the secure engineering principles on all applicable Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to enable systems to fail to an organization-defined known-state for types of failures, preserving system state information in failure.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Based on predictive analysis, process improvements are implemented according to “continuous improvement” practices that affect process changes. ▪ Stakeholders make time-sensitive decisions to support operational efficiency, which may include automated remediation actions via Artificial Intelligence (AI) or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
Assessment Objectives
- SEA-15_A01 restrictions for safe mode of operation are defined.
- SEA-15_A02 conditions detected to enter a safe mode of operation are defined.
- SEA-15_A03 a safe mode of operation is entered with restrictions when conditions are detected.
- SEA-15_A04 systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure failure are defined.
- SEA-15_A05 systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure recovery are defined.
- SEA-15_A06 systems or system components implement the security design principle of secure failure.
- SEA-15_A07 systems or system components implement the security design principle of secure recovery.
- SEA-15_A08 types of system failures for which the system components fail to a known state are defined.
- SEA-15_A09 known system state to which system components fail in the event of a system failure is defined.
- SEA-15_A10 system state information to be preserved in the event of a system failure is defined.
- SEA-15_A11 types of system failures on system components fail to a known system state while preserving system state information in failure.
Evidence Requirements
- E-TDA-05 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
-
Documented evidence of an engineering method designed to define, identify, and present solutions for system failures, problems, or errors.
Technology Design & Acquisition
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)
Small
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)
Medium
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)
Large
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)
Enterprise
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)