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TDA-05.1: Criticality Analysis During Development

TDA 9 — Critical Protect

Mechanisms exist to require the developer of the Technology Asset, Application and/or Service (TAAS) to perform a criticality analysis at organization-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).

Renumbered: Formerly TDA-06.1 in SCF 2025.4.

Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, TDA-05.1 was Physical Diagnostic & Test Interfaces. That control is now TDA-11.5.

Control Question: Does the organization require the developer of the Technology Asset, Application and/or Service (TAAS) to perform a criticality analysis at organization-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC)?

General (25)
Framework Mapping Values
AICPA TSC 2017:2022 (used for SOC 2) (source) PI1.1
COBIT 2019 BAI09.02
ISO 27002 2022 8.29
ISO 27018 2025 8.29
MITRE ATT&CK 16 T1195.003 T1495 T1542 T1542.001 T1542.003 T1542.004 T1542.005 T1553 T1553.006 T1601 T1601.001 T1601.002
NIST 800-53 R5.2 PM-30(01) RA-09 SA-15(03)
NIST 800-53B R5 (moderate) (source) RA-09 SA-15(03)
NIST 800-53B R5 (high) (source) RA-09 SA-15(03)
NIST 800-82 R3 PM-30(01) RA-09 SA-15(03)
NIST 800-82 R3 LOW OT Overlay PM-30(01)
NIST 800-82 R3 MODERATE OT Overlay PM-30(01) RA-09 SA-15(03)
NIST 800-82 R3 HIGH OT Overlay PM-30(01) RA-09 SA-15(03)
NIST 800-160 Vol2 R1 PM-30(01) RA-09
NIST 800-161 R1 RA-9 SA-15(3)
NIST 800-161 R1 Flow Down RA-9
NIST 800-161 R1 Level 1 RA-9
NIST 800-161 R1 Level 2 RA-9 SA-15(3)
NIST 800-161 R1 Level 3 RA-9 SA-15(3)
NIST 800-172 R3 03.11.10E
NIST 800-172A R3 A.03.11.10E.ODP[01]
NIST 800-218 PW.1
NIST CSF 2.0 (source) PR.PS-06
NIST Privacy Framework 1.0 ID.BE-P3
SCF DPMP 2026 11.7
SPARTA 4.0 CM0022
US (8)
Framework Mapping Values
USA Federal DHS CISA SSDAF 1.d
USA Federal C2M2 2.1 ASSET-1c ASSET-1d ASSET-2c ASSET-2d
USA Federal EO 14028 4e(i)(D)
USA Federal CJIS Security Policy 6.0 RA-9
USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (moderate) RA-09 SA-15(03)
USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (high) RA-09 SA-15(03)
USA Federal IRS 1075 2021 SA-15(CE-3) SA-15(CE-3).a SA-15(CE-3).b
USA California CCPA 2025 7123(c)(14)
EMEA (1)
Framework Mapping Values
EMEA Spain CCN-STIC 825 mp.sw.2
APAC (1)
Framework Mapping Values
APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.9 14.4.6.C.01 14.4.6.C.02 14.4.6.C.03
Americas (1)
Framework Mapping Values
Americas Canada OSFI B-13 2022 2.4.5

Capability Maturity Model

Level 0 — Not Performed

Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.

Level 1 — Performed Informally

SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.

Level 2 — Planned & Tracked

Technology Development & Acquisition (TDA) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with TDA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with TDA domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with TDA domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Technology development and acquisition-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Technology development and acquisition management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ Secure development practices mostly conform to industry-recognized standards for secure engineering of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) (e.g., OWASP, NIST SP 800-218 and NIST SP 800-160). ▪ An application development team, or similar function, uses a structured process to design, build and maintain secure configurations for test, development, staging and production environments.

Level 3 — Well Defined

Technology Development & Acquisition (TDA) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with TDA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with TDA domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ A software development team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain TDA domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of technology development and acquisition management (e.g., project management software, software escrow solution and software testing tools). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with TDA domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to require the developer of the Technology Asset, Application and/or Service (TAAS) to perform a criticality analysis at organization-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).

Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled

Technology Development & Acquisition (TDA) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.

Level 5 — Continuously Improving

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Assessment Objectives

  1. TDA-05.1_A01 decision points in the system development life cycle are defined.
  2. TDA-05.1_A02 the breadth of criticality analysis is defined.
  3. TDA-05.1_A03 the depth of criticality analysis is defined.
  4. TDA-05.1_A04 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform a criticality analysis at organization-defined decision points in the system development life cycle.
  5. TDA-05.1_A05 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform a criticality analysis per an organization-defined breadth.
  6. TDA-05.1_A06 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform a criticality analysis per an organization-defined depth.
  7. TDA-05.1_A07 suppliers of critical or mission-essential technologies, products and services are identified.
  8. TDA-05.1_A08 suppliers of critical or mission-essential technologies, products and services are prioritized.
  9. TDA-05.1_A09 suppliers of critical or mission-essential technologies, products and services are assessed.

Technology Recommendations

Micro/Small

  • Note: Typically not required at this size; identify critical components in any custom-developed software

Small

  • Identify critical components/functions during design (simple criticality analysis)

Medium

  • Criticality analysis at design and implementation milestones in the SDLC
  • Results feed threat modeling and testing scope

Large

  • Formal criticality analysis (e.g., NIST SP 800-160) at defined SDLC decision points
  • Developer contract requirements for criticality analysis

Enterprise

  • Enterprise criticality analysis methodology integrated with system security engineering and supply chain risk management
  • Criticality analysis required of internal and third-party developers

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