IRO-05: Indicators of Compromise (IOC)
Mechanisms exist to define specific Indicators of Compromise (IOC) to identify the signs of potential cybersecurity events.
Renumbered: Formerly IRO-03 in SCF 2025.4.
Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, IRO-05 was Incident Response Training. That control is now IRO-10.
Control Question: Does the organization define specific Indicators of Compromise (IOC) to identify the signs of potential cybersecurity events?
General (11)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| COBIT 2019 | DSS02.01 |
| CSA CCM 4.1.0 | LOG-14 |
| CSA IoT SCF 2 | IAM-09 MON-02 MON-09 MON-11 |
| NIST 800-171 R2 (source) | 3.14.7 |
| NIST 800-172 R3 | 03.01.08E 03.02.01E 03.11.02E 03.11.09E 03.14.17E |
| NIST 800-172A R3 | A.03.01.08E.ODP[01] A.03.02.01E.ODP[01] DS-A.03.11.02E.a.01[01] A.03.11.09E.ODP[01] A.03.14.17E.ODP[02] |
| NIST CSF 2.0 (source) | DE.CM |
| Shared Assessments SIG 2025 | J.5 |
| TISAX ISA 6.0.3 | 1.6.1 |
| UN R155 | 7.2.2.2(h) |
| UN ECE WP.29 | 7.2.2.2(h) |
US (6)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal CISA CPG 2022 | 3.A |
| USA Federal DHS CISA TIC 3.0 | 3.UNI.DTDIS |
| USA Federal C2M2 2.1 | SITUATION-2d SITUATION-2h SITUATION-2i |
| USA Federal CMMC 2.0 Level 2 | SIL2.-3.14.7 |
| USA Federal FFIEC ITEH 2016 | III.C |
| USA Federal NERC CIP 2024 | CIP-008-6 1.2.1 CIP-008-6 1.2.2 |
EMEA (9)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA Germany BAIT 2017 | 5.4 |
| EMEA EU DORA RTS 2024 | Article 23.5 Article 23.5(a) |
| EMEA UK CAF 4.0 | C1.f |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 2024 | 3201 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 - L1 2024 | 3201 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 - L2 2024 | 3201 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 - L3 2024 | 3201 |
| EMEA LUX CCSF 20/750 2020 | 3.5.1-59 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia SACS-002 2022 | VII.B.TPC-80 |
APAC (3)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC India RBI Digital Payments 2021 | 36.0 |
| APAC Singapore CCOP CII 2026 | 6.2.2(a) |
| APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 | 11.3.5 |
Americas (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| Americas Canada OSFI B-13 2022 | 2.7.2 3.1 |
| Americas Canada OSFI Self-Assessment Guidance | 2.7.2 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IRO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with DCH domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IRO domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Incident response-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Incident response management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel operate an incident response capability using a documented and tested Incident Response Plan (IRP) to facilitate incident management operations that cover preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IRO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Cybersecurity personnel operate an incident response capability using a documented and tested Incident Response Plan (IRP) to facilitate incident management operations that cover preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery. ▪ An incident response team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain IRO domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of incident response operations (e.g., incident management software). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IRO domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to define specific Indicators of Compromise (IOC) to identify the signs of potential cybersecurity events.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- IRO-05_A01 anomalous or suspicious behavior is defined.
- IRO-05_A02 environments or resources which may contain or may be related to anomalous or suspected adversarial behavior are defined.
- IRO-05_A03 anomalous or suspected adversarial behavior in or related to organization-defined environments or resources are analyzed.
- IRO-05_A04 organizational systems and system components are monitored on an ongoing basis for anomalous or suspicious behavior.
Evidence Requirements
- E-IRO-02 Indicators of Compromise (IOC)
-
Documented evidence of defined Indicators of Compromise (IOC).
Incident Response
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
Small
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
Medium
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
Large
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
Enterprise
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)