MON-16.2: Third-Party Threats
Mechanisms exist to monitor third-party personnel activity for potential security incidents.
Control Question: Does the organization monitor third-party personnel activity for potential security incidents?
General (6)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 (source) | DE.CM-06 |
| Shared Assessments SIG 2025 | J.5 |
| SCF CORE Mergers, Acquisitions & Divestitures (MA&D) | MON-16.2 |
| SCF CORE ESP Level 1 Foundational | MON-16.2 |
| SCF CORE ESP Level 2 Critical Infrastructure | MON-16.2 |
| SCF CORE ESP Level 3 Advanced Threats | MON-16.2 |
US (3)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| US FFIEC | D4.RM.Om.Int.1 |
| US HIPAA HICP Large Practice | 1.L.C |
| US SSA EIESR 8.0 | 5.6 |
EMEA (1)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA Israel CDMO 1.0 | 21.10 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
There is no evidence of a capability to monitor third-party personnel activity for potential security incidents.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
Continuous Monitoring (MON) efforts are ad hoc and inconsistent. CMM Level 1 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:
- Generating event logs and the review of event logs is narrowly-focused to business-critical systems and/ or systems that store, processes and/ or transmit sensitive/regulated data.
- Secure baseline configurations generate logs that contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Continuous Monitoring (MON) efforts are requirements-driven and governed at a local/regional level, but are not consistent across the organization. CMM Level 2 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist: o Identify cybersecurity and data protection controls that are appropriate to address applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for situational awareness management. o Configure alerts for critical or sensitive data that is stored, transmitted and processed on assets. o Use a structured process to review and analyze logs.
- Situational awareness management is decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
- Secure baseline configurations generate logs that contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis.
- IT/cybersecurity personnel:
- A log aggregator, or similar automated tool, provides an event log report generation capability to aid in detecting and assessing anomalous activities on business-critical systems.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Continuous Monitoring (MON) efforts are standardized across the organization and centrally managed, where technically feasible, to ensure consistency. CMM Level 3 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist: o Governs asset management that ensures compliance with requirements for asset management. o Leverages a Configuration Management Database (CMDB), or similar tool, as the authoritative source of IT assets. o Centrally collects logs and is protected according to the manufacturer’s security guidelines to protect the integrity of the event logs with cryptographic mechanisms. o Monitors the organization for Indicators of Compromise (IoC) and provides 24x7x365 near real-time alerting capability. o Is configured to alert incident response personnel of detected suspicious events such that incident responders can look to terminate suspicious events.
- An IT Asset Management (ITAM) function, or similar function:
- A Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar automated tool:
- Both inbound and outbound network traffic is monitored for unauthorized activities to identify prohibited activities and assist incident handlers with identifying potentially compromised systems.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
See C|P-CMM3. There are no defined C|P-CMM4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to monitor third-party personnel activity for potential security incidents.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
See C|P-CMM4. There are no defined C|P-CMM5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to monitor third-party personnel activity for potential security incidents.
Assessment Objectives
- MON-16.2_A01 a legal opinion regarding third-party threat monitoring is obtained.
- MON-16.2_A02 monitoring activities for third-party threats is defined.
- MON-16.2_A03 organization-defined mechanisms are employed to monitor third-party activities for potential security incidents.
Evidence Requirements
- E-IRO-02 Indicators of Compromise (IOC)
-
Documented evidence of defined Indicators of Compromise (IOC).
Incident Response - E-MON-07 Situational Awareness
-
Documented evidence of the organization leveraging knowledge of event log generation to gain situational awareness of cross-domain activities (e.g., technology issues, security events, policy violations, service provider activities, remote workforce activities, physical security events, etc.).
Event Log Monitoring
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Insider Threat program
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
- Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
Small
- Insider Threat program
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
- Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
Medium
- Insider Threat program
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
- Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
- Extended Detection and Response (XDR)
Large
- Insider Threat program
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
- Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
- Extended Detection and Response (XDR)
Enterprise
- Insider Threat program
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
- Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
- Extended Detection and Response (XDR)