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NET-06: Network Segmentation (macrosegementation)

NET 10 — Critical Protect

Mechanisms exist to ensure network architecture utilizes network segmentation to isolate Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to protect from other network resources.

Control Question: Does the organization ensure network architecture utilizes network segmentation to isolate Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to protect from other network resources?

General (35)
Framework Mapping Values
AICPA TSC 2017:2022 (used for SOC 2) (source) CC6.1
CSA CCM 4 IVS-06
CSA IoT SCF 2 SAP-01
GovRAMP Moderate AC-04(21)
GovRAMP High AC-04(21)
IEC TR 60601-4-5 2021 5.2 - CR 5.1
IEC 62443-4-2 2019 CR 5.1 (9.3.1)
IMO Maritime Cyber Risk Management 3.5.3.3
ISO 27002 2022 8.20 8.22
ISO 27017 2015 CLD.9.5.1 13.1.3
MPA Content Security Program 5.1 TS-2.5
NIST Privacy Framework 1.0 PR.AC-P5
NIST 800-53 R4 AC-4(21)
NIST 800-53 R5 (source) AC-4(21)
NIST 800-53 R5 (NOC) (source) AC-4(21)
NIST 800-161 R1 AC-4(21)
NIST 800-161 R1 Level 3 AC-4(21)
NIST 800-171 R2 (source) 3.13.5
NIST 800-171A (source) 3.13.5[a] 3.13.5[b]
NIST 800-171 R3 (source) 03.13.01.b
NIST 800-171A R3 (source) A.03.13.01.b
NIST 800-172 3.14.3e
PCI DSS 4.0.1 (source) 1.2.1 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.2.7 1.2.8 1.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.4.1 1.4.2 11.4.5 11.4.6 12.5.2 A1.1.4 A3.2.1 A3.2.4
PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ A-EP (source) 1.2.1 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.2.7 1.2.8 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.4.1 1.4.2 11.4.5
PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ B-IP (source) 1.2.3 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 11.4.5
PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ C (source) 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 11.4.5
PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ C-VT (source) 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3
PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Merchant (source) 1.2.1 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.2.7 1.2.8 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.4.1 1.4.2 11.4.5 12.5.2
PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Service Provider (source) 1.2.1 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.2.7 1.2.8 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.4.1 1.4.2 11.4.5 11.4.6 12.5.2 A1.1.4
SPARTA CM0038
SWIFT CSF 2023 1.1 1.4 1.5
TISAX ISA 6 5.2.7
SCF CORE Mergers, Acquisitions & Divestitures (MA&D) NET-06
SCF CORE ESP Level 2 Critical Infrastructure NET-06
SCF CORE ESP Level 3 Advanced Threats NET-06
US (23)
Framework Mapping Values
US C2M2 2.1 ARCHITECTURE-2.B.MIL1 ARCHITECTURE-2.D.MIL2 ARCHITECTURE-2.H.MIL3 ARCHITECTURE-2.I.MIL3 ARCHITECTURE-2.J.MIL3 ARCHITECTURE-2.K.MIL3 ARCHITECTURE-2.L.MIL3
US CISA CPG 2022 2.F
US CMMC 2.0 Level 1 (source) SC.L1-B.1.XI
US CMMC 2.0 Level 1 AOs (source) SC.L1-B.1.XI[a] SC.L1-B.1.XI[b]
US CMMC 2.0 Level 2 (source) SC.L2-3.13.5
US CMMC 2.0 Level 3 (source) SC.L2-3.13.5 SI.L3-3.14.3E
US DoD Zero Trust Execution Roadmap 5.2.3 5.3 5.3.2
US DoD Zero Trust Reference Architecture 2.0 3.1
US DHS CISA TIC 3.0 3.PEP.NE.NSEGM
US DHS ZTCF NTW-03
US FAR 52.204-21 52.204-21(b)(1)(xi)
US FedRAMP R4 AC-4(21)
US FedRAMP R4 (moderate) AC-4(21)
US FedRAMP R4 (high) AC-4(21)
US FedRAMP R5 (source) AC-4(21)
US FedRAMP R5 (moderate) (source) AC-4(21)
US FedRAMP R5 (high) (source) AC-4(21)
US HIPAA HICP Medium Practice 6.M.B
US HIPAA HICP Large Practice 6.M.B
US NSTC NSPM-33 6.9
US TSA / DHS 1580/82-2022-01 III.B
US - CA CCPA 2025 7123(c)(10) 7123(c)(5)(B)
US - TX TX-RAMP Level 2 AC-4(21)
EMEA (11)
Framework Mapping Values
EMEA EU EBA GL/2019/04 3.4.4(36)(c)
EMEA EU NIS2 Annex 6.8.1 6.8.2(a) 6.8.2(b) 6.8.2(c) 6.8.2(d) 6.8.2(e) 6.8.2(e) 6.8.2(f) 6.8.2(f) 6.8.2(g) 6.8.2(h)
EMEA Germany C5 2020 COS-06
EMEA Israel CDMO 1.0 9.2 9.18 9.19 10.8 12.4 12.5 12.11
EMEA Saudi Arabia CSCC-1 2019 2-3-1-4 2-4-1-1
EMEA Saudi Arabia IoT CGIoT-1 2024 2-4-4
EMEA Saudi Arabia ECC-1 2018 5-1-3-1 5-1-3-2
EMEA Saudi Arabia OTCC-1 2022 2-4-1-1 2-4-1-2 2-4-1-3 2-4-1-5 2-4-1-10
EMEA Saudi Arabia SACS-002 TPC-38 TPC-40
EMEA Spain CCN-STIC 825 8.4.4 [MP.COM.4]
EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 2508
APAC (6)
Framework Mapping Values
APAC Australia ISM June 2024 ISM-1181 ISM-1269 ISM-1270 ISM-1271 ISM-1577 ISM-1750
APAC India SEBI CSCRF PR.AA.S2
APAC Japan ISMAP 13.1.3 13.1.4.P
APAC New Zealand HISF 2022 HHSP55 HML55 HSUP47
APAC New Zealand HISF Suppliers 2023 HSUP47
APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 11.2.6
Americas (2)
Framework Mapping Values
Americas Canada OSFI B-13 3.2.5
Americas Canada ITSP-10-171 03.13.01.B

Capability Maturity Model

Level 0 — Not Performed

There is no evidence of a capability to ensure network architecture utilizes network segmentation to isolate Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to protect from other network resources.

Level 1 — Performed Informally

Network Security (NET) efforts are ad hoc and inconsistent. CMM Level 1 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:

  • IT personnel use an informal process to design, build and maintain secure networks for test, development, staging and production environments, including the implementation of appropriate cybersecurity and data protection controls.
  • Administrative processes are used to configure boundary devices (e.g., firewalls, routers, etc.) to deny network traffic by default and allow network traffic by exception (e.g., deny all, permit by exception).
  • Network monitoring is primarily reactive in nature.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked

Network Security (NET) efforts are requirements-driven and governed at a local/regional level, but are not consistent across the organization. CMM Level 2 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:

  • Network security management is decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
  • IT/cybersecurity personnel identify cybersecurity and data protection controls that are appropriate to address applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for network security management.
  • IT personnel define secure networking practices to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of the organization's technology assets, data and network(s).
  • Administrative processes and technologies focus on protecting High Value Assets (HVAs), including environments where sensitive/regulated data is stored, transmitted and processed.
  • Administrative processes are used to configure boundary devices (e.g., firewalls, routers, etc.) to deny network traffic by default and allow network traffic by exception (e.g., deny all, permit by exception).
  • Network segmentation exists to implement separate network addresses (e.g., different subnets) to connect systems in different security domains (e.g., sensitive/regulated data environments).
  • Administrative processes require De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) network segments to separate untrusted networks from trusted networks.
  • IT/cybersecurity architects maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.
Level 3 — Well Defined

Network Security (NET) efforts are standardized across the organization and centrally managed, where technically feasible, to ensure consistency. CMM Level 3 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:

  • A Technology Infrastructure team, or similar function, defines centrally-managed network security controls for implementation across the enterprise.
  • Secure engineering principles are used to design and implement network security controls (e.g., industry-recognized secure practices) to enforce the concepts of least privilege and least functionality at the network level.
  • IT/cybersecurity architects work with the Technology Infrastructure team to implement a “layered defense” network architecture that provides a defense-in-depth approach for redundancy and risk reduction for network-based security controls, including wired and wireless networking.
  • Administrative processes and technologies configure boundary devices (e.g., firewalls, routers, etc.) to deny network traffic by default and allow network traffic by exception (e.g., deny all, permit by exception).
  • Technologies automate the Access Control Lists (ACLs) and similar rulesets review process to identify security issues and/ or misconfigurations.
  • Network segmentation exists to implement separate network addresses (e.g., different subnets) to connect systems in different security domains (e.g., sensitive/regulated data environments).
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled

Network Security (NET) efforts are metrics driven and provide sufficient management insight (based on a quantitative understanding of process capabilities) to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and identify areas for improvement. In addition to CMM Level 3 criteria, CMM Level 4 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:

  • Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).
  • Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs).
  • Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties.
  • Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review).
  • Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes.
  • Both business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving

See C|P-CMM4. There are no defined C|P-CMM5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to ensure network architecture utilizes network segmentation to isolate Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) to protect from other network resources.

Assessment Objectives

  1. NET-06_A01 logical isolation techniques are defined.
  2. NET-06_A02 mechanisms and/or techniques used to logically separate information flows are defined.
  3. NET-06_A03 information flows are separated logically using organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques to accomplish organization-defined required separations.
  4. NET-06_A04 publicly accessible system components are identified.
  5. NET-06_A05 subnetworks for publicly accessible system components are physically or logically separated from internal networks.
  6. NET-06_A06 physical isolation techniques and/or organization-defined logical isolation techniques are employed in organizational systems and system components.
  7. NET-06_A07 mechanisms and/or techniques used to physically separate information flows are defined.
  8. NET-06_A08 required separations by types of information are defined.
  9. NET-06_A09 information flows are separated physically using organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques to accomplish organization-defined required separations.
  10. NET-06_A10 subnetworks are implemented for publicly accessible system components that are physically or logically separated from internal networks.

Technology Recommendations

Micro/Small

  • Subnetting
  • Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)

Small

  • Subnetting
  • Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)

Medium

  • Subnetting
  • Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)

Large

  • Subnetting
  • Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)

Enterprise

  • Subnetting
  • Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)

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