TDA-15.1: Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments
Mechanisms exist to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to production Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).
Renumbered: Formerly TDA-08 in SCF 2025.4.
Control Question: Does the organization manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to production Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS)?
General (26)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| CIS CSC 8.1 | 16.8 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG2 | 16.8 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG3 | 16.8 |
| COBIT 2019 | BAI07.04 |
| CSA CCM 4.1.0 | AIS-06 I&S-05 |
| GovRAMP | CM-04(01) |
| GovRAMP High | CM-04(01) |
| ISO 27002 2022 | 8.25 8.31 |
| ISO 27017 2015 | 12.1.4 |
| ISO 27018 2025 | 8.25 8.31 |
| MPA Content Security Program 5.3.1 | TS-2.5 |
| NIST 800-53 R4 | CM-4(1) |
| NIST 800-53 R5.2 | CM-04(01) |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (high) (source) | CM-04(01) |
| NIST 800-82 R3 | CM-04(01) |
| NIST 800-82 R3 HIGH OT Overlay | CM-04(01) |
| NIST 800-160 Vol2 R1 | CM-04(01) |
| NIST 800-161 R1 | CM-4(1) |
| NIST 800-161 R1 Level 3 | CM-4(1) |
| NIST 800-171 R2 (source) | 3.4.5 |
| NIST 800-218 | PO.5 PO.5.1 |
| NIST Privacy Framework 1.0 | PR.DS-P7 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 (source) | 6.5.3 6.5.6 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Merchant (source) | 6.5.3 6.5.6 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Service Provider (source) | 6.5.3 6.5.6 |
| Shared Assessments SIG 2025 | I.1.1 |
US (6)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal CMS MARS-E 2.0 | CM-4(1) |
| USA Federal DHS CISA SSDAF | 1 1.a |
| USA Federal CMMC 2.0 Level 2 | CML2.-3.4.5 |
| USA Federal EO 14028 | 4e(i) 4e(i)(A) |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (high) | CM-04(01) |
| USA California CCPA 2025 | 7123(c)(14) |
EMEA (9)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA CHE FINMA Circular 2023/1 | IV.B.b-51 |
| EMEA Germany C5 2026 | DEV-02.02B.4 DEV-03.01B.3 DEV-12.01B |
| EMEA Spain CCN-STIC 825 | mp.sw.1 |
| EMEA EU DORA RTS 2024 | Article 8.2(b)(v) Article 8.2(b)(vi) Article 8.2(b)(vii) Article 10.4(c) |
| EMEA EU EBA GL/2019/04 | 3.6.2.72 |
| EMEA LUX CCSF 20/750 2020 | 3.6.2-72 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia CSCC-1 2019 | 1-3-2-4 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia ECC-1 2018 | 2-5-3-2 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia SAMA CSF 1.0 2017 | 3.3.7.4.g |
APAC (8)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Australia ISM June 2026 | ISM-0400 ISM-1273 ISM-1274 |
| APAC India SEBI CSCRF 2024 | PR.DS.S5 |
| APAC Japan ISMAP | 12.1.4 12.1.4.1 12.1.4.2 12.1.4.3 12.1.4.4 12.1.4.5 12.1.4.6 12.1.4.7 12.1.4.8 12.1.4.9 |
| APAC Malaysia RMiT 2025 | 10.7 10.28 |
| APAC New Zealand HISF MLHSP 2023 | HHSP58 HML58 |
| APAC New Zealand HISF Suppliers 2023 | HSUP50 |
| APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.9 | 20.2.14.C.06 |
| APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 | 5.7.3 |
Americas (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| Americas Argentina Reg 132 2018 | E.1.2-4 |
| Americas Bermuda BMACCC 2020 | 6.20-BP2 6.20-BP3 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Technology Development & Acquisition (TDA) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with TDA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with TDA domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with TDA domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Technology development and acquisition-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Technology development and acquisition management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ Secure development practices mostly conform to industry-recognized standards for secure engineering of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) (e.g., OWASP, NIST SP 800-218 and NIST SP 800-160). ▪ An application development team, or similar function, uses a structured process to design, build and maintain secure configurations for test, development, staging and production environments.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Technology Development & Acquisition (TDA) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with TDA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with TDA domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ A software development team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain TDA domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of technology development and acquisition management (e.g., project management software, software escrow solution and software testing tools). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with TDA domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to production Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- TDA-15.1_A01 changes to the system are analyzed in a separate test environment before implementation in an operational environment.
- TDA-15.1_A02 changes to the system are analyzed for cybersecurity / data privacy impacts due to flaws.
- TDA-15.1_A03 changes to the system are analyzed for cybersecurity / data privacy impacts due to weaknesses.
- TDA-15.1_A04 changes to the system are analyzed for cybersecurity / data privacy impacts due to incompatibility.
- TDA-15.1_A05 changes to the system are analyzed for cybersecurity / data privacy impacts due to intentional malice.
Evidence Requirements
- E-TDA-20 Development / Test / Production Environment Separation
-
Documented evidence of secure development environments and separation of development, test and production environments, including secure migration practices.
Technology Design & Acquisition
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Separate development/test and production environments (e.g., separate cloud accounts or instances)
Small
- Distinct dev, test and production environments
- Deployment only through defined promotion process
Medium
- Separate dev/test/prod environments with access separation
- Change management for promotion to production
Large
- Environment separation enforced by cloud account/subscription boundaries and network segmentation
- Release management with approval gates
- Separation of Duties (SoD)
Enterprise
- Enterprise environment segregation standards (separate accounts, networks, identities)
- Automated promotion pipelines with approvals
- SoD enforcement and audit