TDA-17.3: Malformed Input Testing
Mechanisms exist to utilize testing methods to ensure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.
Renumbered: Formerly TDA-09.4 in SCF 2025.4.
Control Question: Does the organization utilize testing methods to ensure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces?
General (10)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| NIST AI 600-1 | MS-2.6-006 |
| NIST 800-218 | PW.7 PW.8 |
| OWASP Top 10 2025 | A03:2025 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 (source) | 6.2.4 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ A-EP (source) | 6.2.4 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ C (source) | 6.2.4 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Merchant (source) | 6.2.4 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Service Provider (source) | 6.2.4 |
| UL 2900-1 2017 | 15.1 15.1(a) 15.1(b) 15.1(c) 15.1(d) 15.1(e) 15.1(f) 15.1(g) 15.1(h) 15.1(i) 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 15.10 15.11 |
| UL 2900-2-2 2016 | 15.2.1 15.2.2 15.2.3 15.2.4 15.2.5 15.2.6 15.3.1 15.3.2 15.3.3 15.3.4 |
US (1)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal 21 CFR Part 11 2025 | 11.10 |
EMEA (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA Germany C5 2026 | COS-01.02B.4 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia ECC-1 2018 | 1-6-3-3 |
APAC (3)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Australia ISM June 2026 | ISM-0402 ISM-2057 |
| APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.9 | 14.5.6.C.01 |
| APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 | 6.1.6 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Technology Development & Acquisition (TDA) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with TDA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with TDA domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with TDA domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Technology development and acquisition-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Technology development and acquisition management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ Secure development practices mostly conform to industry-recognized standards for secure engineering of Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) (e.g., OWASP, NIST SP 800-218 and NIST SP 800-160). ▪ An application development team, or similar function, uses a structured process to design, build and maintain secure configurations for test, development, staging and production environments. ▪ An application development team, or similar function, implements a process to check the validity of information inputs.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Technology Development & Acquisition (TDA) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with TDA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with TDA domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ A software development team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain TDA domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of technology development and acquisition management (e.g., project management software, software escrow solution and software testing tools). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with TDA domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to utilize testing methods to ensure Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Technology Development & Acquisition (TDA) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- TDA-17.3_A01 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform testing to ensure it continues to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.
Evidence Requirements
- E-TDA-03 Application Security Testing (AST)
-
Documented evidence of application security testing (e.g., DAST, SAST, fuzzing, etc.).
Technology Design & Acquisition
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Note: Typically not required at this size; basic negative testing of inputs
Small
- Negative/edge-case input testing in QA
Medium
- Fuzz testing for critical inputs and parsers (e.g., AFL++, libFuzzer, OWASP ZAP fuzzer)
- Robustness testing
Large
- Fuzzing integrated in CI/CD for critical components
- Protocol/API fuzzing (e.g., boofuzz, Peach)
- Fault injection testing
Enterprise
- Enterprise fuzzing and robustness testing program (e.g., OSS-Fuzz style continuous fuzzing, commercial fuzzers)
- Chaos/fault injection engineering
- Coverage-guided fuzzing metrics