Skip to main content

TPM-05.1: Outsourcing Non-Essential Functions or Services

TPM 3 — Low Protect

Mechanisms exist to identify non-essential functions or services that are capable of being outsourced to external service providers and align with the organization's enterprise architecture and security standards.

Renumbered: Formerly SEA-02.2 in SCF 2025.4.

Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, TPM-05.1 was Security Compromise Notification Agreements. That control is now TPM-21.1.

Control Question: Does the organization identify non-essential functions or services that are capable of being outsourced to external service providers and align with its enterprise architecture and security standards?

General (3)
Framework Mapping Values
NIST 800-53 R5.2 PM-07(01)
NIST 800-82 R3 PM-07(01)
NIST 800-160 Vol2 R1 PM-07(01)
US (1)
Framework Mapping Values
USA New York DFS 23 NYCRR500 2023 Amd 2 500.2(d)
EMEA (1)
Framework Mapping Values
EMEA Spain Royal Decree 311 2022 Article 14(1)
APAC (2)

Capability Maturity Model

Level 0 — Not Performed

Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.

Level 1 — Performed Informally

SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.

Level 2 — Planned & Tracked

Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with SEA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with SEA domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with SEA domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Secure engineering and architecture-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Secure engineering and architecture management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel define entity-specific secure engineering practices to protect the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Safety (CIAS) of the entity's TAASD. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel align secure engineering practices with the entity's broader IT architecture practices. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel use secure engineering practices to influence Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC).

Level 3 — Well Defined

Third-Party Management (TPM) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with TPM domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with TPM domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ A procurement team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain TPM domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of third-party management operations (e.g., TPRM risk management solution and vendor management solution). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with TPM domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to identify non-essential functions or services that are capable of being outsourced to external service providers and align with the organization's enterprise architecture and security standards.

Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Level 5 — Continuously Improving

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Assessment Objectives

  1. TPM-05.1_A01 non-essential functions or services to be offloaded are defined.
  2. TPM-05.1_A02 non-essential functions or services are offloaded to other systems, system components or an external provider.

Evidence Requirements

E-TPM-11 Supplier Diversity & Concentration Risk Analysis

Documented evidence of supplier diversity, adequate supply and outsourcing limitation analyses addressing single-source / concentration dependencies.

Third-Party Management

Technology Recommendations

Micro/Small

  • Identify non-core IT functions suitable for outsourcing (e.g., email hosting)

Small

  • Documented list of outsourced non-essential functions with security requirements

Medium

  • Outsourcing decisions aligned with business strategy and risk assessment
  • Security requirements in outsourcing contracts

Large

  • Sourcing strategy identifying outsourceable non-essential functions
  • Third-party risk assessment before outsourcing
  • Contractual security requirements

Enterprise

  • Enterprise sourcing governance aligned with business strategy and C-SCRM
  • Outsourcing risk assessments and regulatory notifications where required

The Secure Controls Framework (SCF) is maintained by SCF Council. Use of SCF content is subject to the SCF Terms & Conditions.

Manage this control in SCF Connect

Track implementation status, collect evidence, and map controls to your compliance frameworks automatically.