VPM-10: Red Team Exercises
Mechanisms exist to utilize "red team" exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in accordance with organization-defined rules of engagement.
Control Question: Does the organization utilize "red team" exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in accordance with organization-defined rules of engagement?
General (8)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| CSA IoT SCF 2 | SET-03 |
| NIST AI 600-1 | MP-5.1-005 MS-1.1-008 MS-1.3-002 MS-2.10-001 MS-2.7-007 |
| NIST 800-53 R4 | CA-8(2) |
| NIST 800-53 R5 (source) | CA-8(2) |
| NIST 800-53 R5 (NOC) (source) | CA-8(2) |
| SCF CORE Mergers, Acquisitions & Divestitures (MA&D) | VPM-10 |
| SCF CORE ESP Level 2 Critical Infrastructure | VPM-10 |
| SCF CORE ESP Level 3 Advanced Threats | VPM-10 |
US (6)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| US DHS CISA TIC 3.0 | 3.UNL.STEXE |
| US FedRAMP R5 (source) | CA-8(2) |
| US FedRAMP R5 (moderate) (source) | CA-8(2) |
| US FedRAMP R5 (high) (source) | CA-8(2) |
| US FFIEC | D3.DC.Ev.Int.2 |
| US TSA / DHS 1580/82-2022-01 | III.F.2.c |
EMEA (3)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA Germany Banking Supervisory Requirements for IT (BAIT) | 5.6 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia IoT CGIoT-1 2024 | 2-10-2 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia OTCC-1 2022 | 2-13-1-9 |
APAC (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC India SEBI CSCRF | DE.DP.S4 |
| APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 | 13.3.1 13.3.2 13.4.1 13.4.2 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
There is no evidence of a capability to utilize "red team" exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in accordance with organization-defined rules of engagement.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
C|P-CMM1 is N/A, since a structured process is required to utilize "red team" exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in accordance with organization-defined rules of engagement.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) efforts are requirements-driven and governed at a local/regional level, but are not consistent across the organization. CMM Level 2 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist: o Identify cybersecurity and data protection controls to address applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for ASM. o Apply software patches and other vulnerability remediation efforts.
- Attack Surface Management (ASM) is decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
- IT/cybersecurity personnel:
- Administrative processes and technologies focus on protecting High Value Assets (HVAs), including environments where sensitive/regulated data is stored, transmitted and processed.
- Administrative processes exist to use red team exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in accordance with organization-defined rules of engagement.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) efforts are standardized across the organization and centrally managed, where technically feasible, to ensure consistency. CMM Level 3 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist: o Defines the scope of ASM activities. o Provides governance oversight for the implementation of applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual cybersecurity and data protection controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of the organization's applications, systems, services and data with regards to ASM. o Provides oversight of ASM activities to centrally manage the flaw remediation process as part of the organization's overall Patch& Vulnerability & Patch Management Program (VPMP). o Manages the identification, tracking and remediation of vulnerabilities. o Utilizes a Security Incident Event monitor (SIEM), or similar automated tool, to monitor for unauthorized activities, accounts, connections, devices and software according to organization-specific Indicators of Compromise (IoC), including feeds from applications, hosts, network devices and vulnerability scanners.
- An IT Asset Management (ITAM) function, or similar function, categorizes devices according to the data the asset stores, transmits and/ or processes and applies the appropriate technology controls to protect the asset and data.
- A Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) function, or similar function:
- A Security Operations Center (SOC), or similar function:
- Asset custodians install the latest stable version of security-related updates on all systems within the organization-defined time requirements.
- Administrative processes exist to use red team exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in accordance with organization-defined rules of engagement.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) efforts are metrics driven and provide sufficient management insight (based on a quantitative understanding of process capabilities) to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and identify areas for improvement. In addition to CMM Level 3 criteria, CMM Level 4 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:
- Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).
- Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs).
- Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties.
- Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review).
- Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes.
- Both business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
See C|P-CMM4. There are no defined C|P-CMM5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to utilize "red team" exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) in accordance with organization-defined rules of engagement.
Assessment Objectives
- VPM-10_A01 red team exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise organizational systems are defined.
- VPM-10_A02 organization-defined red team exercises are employed to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise organizational systems in accordance with applicable rules of engagement.
Technology Recommendations
Large
- "red team" exercises
Enterprise
- "red team" exercises