IRO-09: Incident Response Capabilities Testing
Mechanisms exist to formally test incident response capabilities through realistic exercises to determine the operational effectiveness of those capabilities.
Renumbered: Formerly IRO-06 in SCF 2025.4.
Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, IRO-09 was Situational Awareness For Incidents. That control is now IRO-16.1.
Control Question: Does the organization formally test incident response capabilities through realistic exercises to determine the operational effectiveness of those capabilities?
General (36)
US (19)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal CMS MARS-E 2.0 | IR-3 IR-3.a IR-3.b IR-3.c IR-3(2) |
| USA Federal CISA CPG 2022 | 2.S |
| USA Federal DHS CISA TIC 3.0 | 3.UNL.STEXE |
| USA Federal C2M2 2.1 | RESPONSE-3g |
| USA Federal DoW BaTB OT 2026 | 4 |
| USA Federal CMMC 2.0 Level 2 | IRL2.-3.6.3 |
| USA Federal CJIS Security Policy 6.0 | IR-3 |
| USA Federal FFIEC ITEH 2016 | III.D |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (moderate) | IR-03 |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (high) | IR-03 |
| USA Federal IRS 1075 2021 | IR-3 IR-3(CE-3).a |
| USA Federal 33 CFR Part 101 Subpart F | 101.635(a)(1) 101.635(b)(1) 101.635(b)(2) 101.635(b)(3) 101.635(c)(1) 101.635(c)(2) 101.635(c)(2)(i) 101.635(c)(2)(ii) 101.635(c)(2)(iii) 101.635(c)(2)(iv) 101.635(c)(3) 101.635(c)(4) 101.635(c)(5) |
| USA Federal NERC CIP 2024 | CIP-008-6 2.1 CIP-008-6 3.1 |
| USA Federal NSF RIG 2025 | 5.3.6 / NSF14 |
| USA Federal TSA SDP 2021-02F | III.F.1.e |
| USA California CCPA 2025 | 7123(c)(17)(B)(ii) |
| USA New York DFS 23 NYCRR500 2023 Amd 2 | 500.16(d)(1) |
| USA Texas DIR SCSC 2.2 2025 | IR-03 |
| USA Texas TX-RAMP Level 2 | IR-03 |
EMEA (8)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA Germany C5 2026 | SIM-03.01AC BCM-04.01AC |
| EMEA Spain CCN-STIC 825 | op.cont.3 |
| EMEA EU NIS2 Annex 2024 | 3.5.5 |
| EMEA UK CAF 4.0 | D1.c |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 2024 | 4103 4105 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 - L2 2024 | 4103 4105 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 - L3 2024 | 4103 4105 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia OTCC-1 2022 | 2-12-1-7 |
APAC (10)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Australia CCM 2026 | GOV-07 |
| APAC Australia ISM June 2026 | ISM-2006 |
| APAC Australia Prudential Standard CPS230 2023 | 27(c) |
| APAC Australia Prudential Standard CPS234 2019 | 26.0 27.0 27(a) 27(b) 27(c) 27(d) 27(e) |
| APAC Australia SOCI 2028 | 30CM 30CN 30CQ |
| APAC India SEBI CSCRF 2024 | DE.DP.S2 GV.RM.S3 |
| APAC Japan ISMAP | 16.1.1.14 |
| APAC Malaysia RMiT 2025 | 11.16 11.16(a) |
| APAC Singapore CCOP CII 2026 | 7.3.1 7.3.1(a) 7.3.1(b) 7.3.3 7.3.3(b) 7.3.4 7.3.5 7.3.5(a) 7.3.5(d) 7.3.6 7.3.7 7.3.7(a) 7.3.7(b) 7.3.7(c) 7.3.7(d) 7.3.7(e) |
| APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 | 13.3.1 13.3.2 13.5.2 |
Americas (4)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| Americas Bermuda BMACCC 2020 | 6.4 |
| Americas Canada ITSP-10-171 2025 | 03.06.03 |
| Americas Canada OSFI B-13 2022 | 2.7.2 |
| Americas Canada OSFI Self-Assessment Guidance | 2.7.2 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IRO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with DCH domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IRO domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Incident response-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Incident response management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel operate an incident response capability using a documented and tested Incident Response Plan (IRP) to facilitate incident management operations that cover preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery. ▪ Incident responders are proficient on their specific IRP role(s) and responsibilities through recurring training events (e.g., annual rock drill). ▪ On at least an annual basis, IT and/or cybersecurity personnel conduct tabletop exercises to validate disaster recovery and contingency plans, in conjunction with stakeholders and any required vendors.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with IRO domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Cybersecurity personnel operate an incident response capability using a documented and tested Incident Response Plan (IRP) to facilitate incident management operations that cover preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery. ▪ An incident response team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain IRO domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of incident response operations (e.g., incident management software). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with IRO domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to formally test incident response capabilities through realistic exercises to determine the operational effectiveness of those capabilities.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Incident Response (IRO) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- IRO-09_A01 the frequency at which to test the effectiveness of the incident response capability for the system is defined.
- IRO-09_A02 tests used to test the effectiveness of the incident response capability for the system are defined.
- IRO-09_A03 the incident response capability is tested.
- IRO-09_A04 the effectiveness of the incident response capability is tested per an organization-defined frequency.
- IRO-09_A05 a frequency at which to test intrusion-monitoring tools and mechanisms is defined.
- IRO-09_A06 intrusion-monitoring tools and mechanisms are tested frequently.
- IRO-09_A07 the effectiveness of the incident response capability is tested <A.03.06.03.ODP[01]: frequency>.
Evidence Requirements
- E-IRO-04 IRP Testing
-
Documented evidence of an Incident Response Plan (IRP)-related testing activity.
Incident Response - E-IRO-05 Table Top Exercises
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Documented evidence of "table top" exercises that test incident response practices.
Incident Response
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- "Table Top" incident response exercises (rock drills)
Small
- "Table Top" incident response exercises (rock drills)
Medium
- "Table Top" incident response exercises (rock drills)
- "Red team vs blue team" exercises
- EICAR test file antimalware detection and response exercises
Large
- "Table Top" incident response exercises (rock drills)
- "Red team vs blue team" exercises
- EICAR test file antimalware detection and response exercises
Enterprise
- "Table Top" incident response exercises (rock drills)
- "Red team vs blue team" exercises
- EICAR test file antimalware detection and response exercises