MON-03.2: Audit Trails
Mechanisms exist to link system access to individual users or service accounts.
Control Question: Does the organization link system access to individual users or service accounts?
General (13)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| CSA CCM 4 | LOG-02 |
| NAIC Insurance Data Security Model Law (MDL-668) | 4.D(2)(i) |
| NIST 800-171A (source) | 3.3.2[a] 3.3.1[c] |
| NIST 800-171 R3 (source) | 03.03.01.a |
| OWASP Top 10 2021 | A09:2021 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 (source) | 10.2 10.2.1 10.2.1.1 10.2.1.2 10.2.1.3 10.2.1.4 10.2.1.5 10.2.1.6 10.2.1.7 10.2.2 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ A-EP (source) | 10.2.1 10.2.1.1 10.2.1.2 10.2.1.3 10.2.1.4 10.2.1.5 10.2.1.6 10.2.1.7 10.2.2 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ C (source) | 10.2.1.2 10.2.1.4 10.2.1.5 10.2.2 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Merchant (source) | 10.2.1 10.2.1.1 10.2.1.2 10.2.1.3 10.2.1.4 10.2.1.5 10.2.1.6 10.2.1.7 10.2.2 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Service Provider (source) | 10.2.1 10.2.1.1 10.2.1.2 10.2.1.3 10.2.1.4 10.2.1.5 10.2.1.6 10.2.1.7 10.2.2 |
| SCF CORE Mergers, Acquisitions & Divestitures (MA&D) | MON-03.2 |
| SCF CORE ESP Level 2 Critical Infrastructure | MON-03.2 |
| SCF CORE ESP Level 3 Advanced Threats | MON-03.2 |
US (10)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| US DHS CISA SSDAF | 1.b |
| US DHS CISA TIC 3.0 | 3.UNI.AACCO |
| US EO 14028 | 4e(i)(B) |
| US FDA 21 CFR Part 11 | 11.10 11.10(b) 11.10(c) 11.10(e) |
| US HIPAA Administrative Simplification 2013 (source) | 164.312(b) |
| US HIPAA Security Rule / NIST SP 800-66 R2 (source) | 164.312(b) |
| US NNPI (unclass) | 3.1 3.2 7.1 |
| US SSA EIESR 8.0 | 5.4 |
| US TSA / DHS 1580/82-2022-01 | III.D.3.b |
| US - CA CCPA 2025 | 7123(c)(7) |
EMEA (4)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA EU NIS2 Annex | 11.5.2(b) |
| EMEA Israel CDMO 1.0 | 12.17 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia CSCC-1 2019 | 2-11-1-3 |
| EMEA UK DEFSTAN 05-138 | 3107 |
APAC (5)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Australia ISM June 2024 | ISM-0407 |
| APAC New Zealand HISF 2022 | HHSP70 HML70 HSUP61 |
| APAC New Zealand HISF Suppliers 2023 | HSUP61 |
| APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.6 | 16.6.8.C.01 16.6.9.C.01 16.6.10.C.01 16.6.10.C.02 |
| APAC Singapore MAS TRM 2021 | 9.2.2 |
Americas (1)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| Americas Canada ITSP-10-171 | 03.03.01.A |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
There is no evidence of a capability to link system access to individual users or service accounts.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
Continuous Monitoring (MON) efforts are ad hoc and inconsistent. CMM Level 1 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist:
- Generating event logs and the review of event logs is narrowly-focused to business-critical systems and/ or systems that store, processes and/ or transmit sensitive/regulated data.
- Secure baseline configurations generate logs that contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis.
- Secure baseline configurations restrict access to event logs from privileged users to protect event logs and audit tools from unauthorized access, modification and deletion.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Continuous Monitoring (MON) efforts are requirements-driven and governed at a local/regional level, but are not consistent across the organization. CMM Level 2 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist: o Identify cybersecurity and data protection controls that are appropriate to address applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for situational awareness management. o Configure alerts for critical or sensitive data that is stored, transmitted and processed on assets. o Use a structured process to review and analyze logs.
- Situational awareness management is decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
- Secure baseline configurations generate logs that contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis.
- IT/cybersecurity personnel:
- A log aggregator, or similar automated tool, provides an event log report generation capability to aid in detecting and assessing anomalous activities on business-critical systems.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Continuous Monitoring (MON) efforts are standardized across the organization and centrally managed, where technically feasible, to ensure consistency. CMM Level 3 control maturity would reasonably expect all, or at least most, the following criteria to exist: o Governs asset management that ensures compliance with requirements for asset management. o Leverages a Configuration Management Database (CMDB), or similar tool, as the authoritative source of IT assets. o Centrally collects logs and is protected according to the manufacturer’s security guidelines to protect the integrity of the event logs with cryptographic mechanisms. o Monitors the organization for Indicators of Compromise (IoC) and provides 24x7x365 near real-time alerting capability. o Is configured to alert incident response personnel of detected suspicious events such that incident responders can look to terminate suspicious events.
- An IT Asset Management (ITAM) function, or similar function:
- A Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar automated tool:
- Both inbound and outbound network traffic is monitored for unauthorized activities to identify prohibited activities and assist incident handlers with identifying potentially compromised systems.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
See C|P-CMM3. There are no defined C|P-CMM4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to link system access to individual users or service accounts.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
See C|P-CMM4. There are no defined C|P-CMM5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to link system access to individual users or service accounts.
Assessment Objectives
- MON-03.2_A01 the content of the audit records needed to support the ability to uniquely trace users to their actions is defined.
- MON-03.2_A02 audit records are created (generated).
- MON-03.2_A03 audit records contain information that establishes the identity of any individuals, subjects or objects/entities associated with the event.
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)
Small
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)
Medium
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)
Large
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)
Enterprise
- Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC)