MON-04.1: System-Wide / Time-Correlated Audit Trail
Automated mechanisms exist to compile audit records into an organization-wide audit trail that is time-correlated.
Renumbered: Formerly MON-02.7 in SCF 2025.4.
Control Question: Does the organization use automated mechanisms to compile audit records into an organization-wide audit trail that is time-correlated?
General (19)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| CIS CSC 8.1 | 8.2 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG1 | 8.2 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG2 | 8.2 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG3 | 8.2 |
| CSA IoT SCF 2 | MON-07 |
| GovRAMP | AU-12(01) |
| GovRAMP High | AU-12(01) |
| NIST 800-53 R4 | AU-12(1) |
| NIST 800-53 R5.2 | AU-12(01) |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (high) (source) | AU-12(01) |
| NIST 800-82 R3 | AU-12(01) |
| NIST 800-82 R3 HIGH OT Overlay | AU-12(01) |
| NIST 800-171 R3 (source) | 03.03.01.a |
| NIST 800-171A R3 (source) | A.03.03.01.a |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 (source) | 10.6 10.6.1 10.6.2 10.6.3 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ A-EP (source) | 10.6.1 10.6.2 10.6.3 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ C (source) | 10.6.1 10.6.2 10.6.3 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Merchant (source) | 10.6.1 10.6.2 10.6.3 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Service Provider (source) | 10.6.1 10.6.2 10.6.3 |
US (9)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| USA Federal CMS MARS-E 2.0 | AU-12(1) |
| USA Federal DHS CISA SSDAF | 1.b.i 1.b.ii |
| USA Federal DHS CISA TIC 3.0 | 3.UNI.AACCO |
| USA Federal DoD Zero Trust Execution Roadmap v1.1 | 7.1 |
| USA Federal EO 14028 | 4e(i)(B) |
| USA Federal FedRAMP R5 (high) | AU-12(01) |
| USA Federal IRS 1075 2021 | AU-12(CE-1) |
| USA California CCPA 2025 | 7123(c)(7) |
| USA Texas DIR SCSC 2.2 2025 | AU-02-SID |
APAC (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Australia ISM June 2026 | ISM-0988 |
| APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.9 | 16.6.11.C.02 |
Americas (2)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| Americas Canada ITSP-10-171 2025 | 03.03.01.A |
| Americas Canada OSFI B-13 2022 | 3.3.1 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with MON domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Continuous monitoring-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Continuous monitoring may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC) enforce security event logging to contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis. ▪ SBC enforce logging to link system access to individual users or service accounts using a non-repudiation capability to protect against an individual falsely denying having performed a particular action. ▪ SBC enforce local security event logging and forward those logs to a centralized log repository to provide an alternate audit capability in the event of a failure in the primary audit capability.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Cybersecurity personnel use a structured process via Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) to review and analyze logs. ▪ A Security Operations Center (SOC) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain MON domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of continuous monitoring operations (e.g., Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC) enforce security event logging to contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis. ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to automatically compile audit records into an organization-wide audit trail that is time-correlated.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Based on predictive analysis, process improvements are implemented according to “continuous improvement” practices that affect process changes. ▪ Stakeholders make time-sensitive decisions to support operational efficiency, which may include automated remediation actions via Artificial Intelligence (AI) or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
Assessment Objectives
- MON-04.1_A01 system components from which audit records are to be compiled into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail are defined.
- MON-04.1_A02 level of tolerance for the relationship between timestamps of individual records in the audit trail is defined.
- MON-04.1_A03 audit records from organization-defined system components are compiled into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is time-correlated to within organization-defined level of tolerance.
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Small
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Medium
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Large
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Enterprise
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)