MON-05: Centralized Collection of Event Logs & Security-Relevant Telemetry
Mechanisms exist to utilize a Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of event logs and security-relevant telemetry.
Renumbered: Formerly MON-02 in SCF 2025.4.
Code reused: In SCF 2025.4 and earlier, MON-05 was Response To Event Log Processing Failures. That control is now MON-33.
Control Question: Does the organization utilize a Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event logs?
General (47)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| AICPA TSC 2017:2022 (used for SOC 2) (source) | CC7.2 CC7.2-POF1 CC7.3 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 | 3.14 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.12 13.1 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG1 | 8.1 8.2 8.3 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG2 | 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 13.1 |
| CIS CSC 8.1 IG3 | 3.14 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.12 13.1 |
| CSA IoT SCF 2 | MON-07 |
| GovRAMP | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| GovRAMP Core | SI-04 |
| GovRAMP Low | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| GovRAMP Low+ | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| GovRAMP Moderate | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| GovRAMP High | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| IEC 62443-3-3 2013 | SR 2.8 RE 1 |
| ISO 27002 2022 | 8.15 |
| ISO 27017 2015 | 12.4.1 |
| ISO 27018 2025 | 8.15 |
| NIST 800-53 R4 | AU-2 AU-2(3) AU-6 IR-4(4) SI-4 |
| NIST 800-53 R5.2 | AU-02 AU-06 IR-04(04) SI-04 |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (low) (source) | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (moderate) (source) | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (high) (source) | AU-02 AU-06 IR-04(04) SI-04 |
| NIST 800-53B R5 (privacy) (source) | AU-02 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 | AU-02 AU-06 IR-04(04) SI-04 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 LOW OT Overlay | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 MODERATE OT Overlay | AU-02 AU-06 SI-04 |
| NIST 800-82 R3 HIGH OT Overlay | AU-02 AU-06 IR-04(04) SI-04 |
| NIST 800-160 Vol2 R1 | AU-06 IR-04(04) |
| NIST 800-161 R1 | AU-2 AU-6 SI-4 |
| NIST 800-161 R1 C-SCRM Baseline | AU-2 AU-6 SI-4 |
| NIST 800-161 R1 Flow Down | AU-2 SI-4 |
| NIST 800-161 R1 Level 1 | AU-2 SI-4 |
| NIST 800-161 R1 Level 2 | AU-2 AU-6 SI-4 |
| NIST 800-161 R1 Level 3 | AU-2 AU-6 SI-4 |
| NIST 800-171 R2 (source) | 3.3.1 3.3.3 3.3.5 3.3.6 3.3.8 3.3.9 |
| NIST 800-171 R3 (source) | 03.03.05.a 03.03.05.c |
| NIST 800-171A R3 (source) | A.03.03.05.ODP[01] A.03.03.05.a A.03.03.05.c[01] |
| NIST 800-207 | NIST Tenet 5 NIST Tenet 7 |
| NIST CSF 2.0 (source) | DE.AE-03 DE.AE-06 |
| OWASP Top 10 2025 | A09:2025 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 (source) | 10.3.3 10.4 10.4.1 10.4.1.1 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ A-EP (source) | 10.3.3 10.4.1 10.4.1.1 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ C (source) | 10.3.3 10.4.1 10.4.1.1 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Merchant (source) | 10.3.3 10.4.1 10.4.1.1 |
| PCI DSS 4.0.1 SAQ D Service Provider (source) | 10.3.3 10.4.1 10.4.1.1 |
| SCF DPMP 2026 | 7.0 7.13 |
| SWIFT CSF 2025 | 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 |
| TISAX ISA 6.0.3 | 5.2.4 |
US (20)
EMEA (10)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| EMEA CHE FINMA Circular 2023/1 | IV.C.c-65 |
| EMEA Germany C5 2026 | OPS-13.01B OPS-13.02B COS-01.03B PSS-04.01AC |
| EMEA Spain CCN-STIC 825 | op.exp.8 |
| EMEA EU DORA RTS 2024 | Article 23.2(a)(i) |
| EMEA EU EBA GL/2019/04 | 3.4.5.38 3.4.5.39 3.5.52 |
| EMEA EU NIS2 Annex 2024 | 3.2.6 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia CSCC-1 2019 | 2-11-1-3 2-11-1-4 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia ECC-1 2018 | 2-12-3-3 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia OTCC-1 2022 | 2-11-1-5 2-11-1-6 2-11-1-7 2-11-1-8 |
| EMEA Saudi Arabia SAMA CSF 1.0 2017 | 3.3.14.4.j |
APAC (8)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| APAC Australia CCM 2026 | DET-01 DET-03 |
| APAC Australia Essential 8 2024 | ISM-0109 ISM-1228 ISM-1509 ISM-1650 ISM-1660 ISM-1683 |
| APAC Australia ISM June 2026 | ISM-0109 ISM-1228 ISM-1405 ISM-1509 ISM-1536 ISM-1537 ISM-1566 ISM-1650 ISM-1660 ISM-1683 ISM-1911 ISM-1960 ISM-1963 ISM-1976 ISM-1977 ISM-1978 ISM-1979 ISM-1983 ISM-1986 ISM-1987 |
| APAC India RBI PA 2025 | Annex 1.1.15 |
| APAC India RBI PPI 2025 | 18.3.b |
| APAC Malaysia RMiT 2025 | A5-C2(a) |
| APAC New Zealand NZISM 3.9 | 16.6.11.C.01 16.6.11.C.02 16.6.11.C.03 16.6.12.C.01 16.6.12.C.02 16.6.12.C.03 |
| APAC Singapore CCOP CII 2026 | 6.2.1(b) |
Americas (3)
| Framework | Mapping Values |
|---|---|
| Americas Canada ITSP-10-171 2025 | 03.03.05.A 03.03.05.C |
| Americas Canada OSFI B-13 2022 | 3.3.1 |
| Americas Canada OSFI Self-Assessment Guidance | 3.3.1 3.3.2 |
Capability Maturity Model
Level 0 — Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 — Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 — Planned & Tracked
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with MON domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Continuous monitoring-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Continuous monitoring may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel. ▪ A log aggregator, or similar automated tool, provides an event log report generation capability to aid in detecting and assessing anomalous activities on business-critical TAASD. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel configure alerts for critical or sensitive data that is stored, transmitted and processed on assets.
Level 3 — Well Defined
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Cybersecurity personnel use a structured process via Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) to review and analyze logs. ▪ A Security Operations Center (SOC) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain MON domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of continuous monitoring operations (e.g., Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC) enforce security event logging to contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis. ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to utilize a Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event logs.
Level 4 — Quantitatively Controlled
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.
Level 5 — Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions: ▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control. ▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies. ▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Assessment Objectives
- MON-05_A01 the frequency at which system audit records are reviewed and analyzed is defined.
- MON-05_A02 system audit records are reviewed and analyzed per an organization-defined frequency for indications and the potential impact of inappropriate or unusual activity.
- MON-05_A03 audit records across different repositories are analyzed to gain organization-wide situational awareness.
- MON-05_A04 automated mechanisms used for integrating audit record review, analysis and reporting processes are defined.
- MON-05_A05 audit record review, analysis and reporting processes are integrated using organization-defined automated mechanisms.
- MON-05_A06 the frequency or situation requiring logging for each specified event type is defined.
- MON-05_A07 the event logging function is coordinated with other organizational entities requiring audit-related information to guide and inform the selection criteria for events to be logged.
- MON-05_A08 the event types selected for logging are reviewed / updated organization-defined frequency.
- MON-05_A09 a rationale is provided for why the event types selected for logging are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of incidents.
- MON-05_A10 system audit records are reviewed and analyzed per an organization-defined frequency for indications of organization-defined inappropriate or unusual activity and the potential impact of the inappropriate or unusual activity.
- MON-05_A11 findings are reported to organization-defined personnel or roles.
- MON-05_A12 the level of audit record review, analysis and reporting within the system is adjusted when there is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence information or other credible sources of information.
- MON-05_A13 system audit records are reviewed and analyzed <A.03.03.05.ODP[01]: frequency> for indications and the potential impact of inappropriate or unusual activity.
- MON-05_A14 a Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar automated tool, centrally collects event logs and security-relevant telemetry.
Evidence Requirements
- E-MON-02 Malware Activity
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Documented evidence of malware activity being logged and included as part of the centralized event log collection and review/analysis process.
Event Log Monitoring - E-MON-05 Centralized Event Log Collection
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Documented evidence of security-relevant activities being logged and included as part of the centralized event log collection and review/analysis process.
Event Log Monitoring
Technology Recommendations
Micro/Small
- Centralized log collector (e.g., Windows Event Forwarding, syslog server)
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
- Cloud logging (e.g., Microsoft Sentinel free tier, AWS CloudWatch)
Small
- Centralized log collector (e.g., Graylog free, Elastic Stack free)
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
- Cloud SIEM (e.g., Microsoft Sentinel, Sumo Logic)
Medium
- Centralized log collector
- Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM) (e.g., Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, IBM QRadar)
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Large
- Enterprise SIEM with centralized log collection (e.g., Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel)
- Log management platform (e.g., Splunk, Elastic Stack, Graylog)
- Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Enterprise
- Enterprise SIEM with scalable log ingestion (e.g., Splunk Enterprise, IBM QRadar)
- Log management and analytics platform
- Managed Detection and Response (MDR) or in-house SOC
- Log data lake for long-term retention and threat hunting